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INTRODUCTION
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Commentators1 and judges2 have frequently criticized
Supreme Court decisions involving statutory construction. That
criticism is especially sharp when the statute to be interpreted
involves the requisite mens rea to be applied to various elements
of a criminal offense. 3 Despite the recognition that the Supreme
Court's case law is "ad hoc" and confusing, Congress has
compounded the problem by enacting new statutes using the same
grammatical constructions that produced the "ad hoc" results in the
past. 4 In addition, Congress has consistently refused to enact a
general culpability provision which might give guidance to lower
1.
See Shirley S. Abrahamson and Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance?
Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV.
1045, 1048 (1991); see also William S. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 324
(1990); Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory
Interpretation: Underenforcement, Overenforcement and the Problem of
Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767, 768 (1991); Burt Neuborne,
Background Nonns for Federal Statutory Interpretation, 22 CONN. L. REV. 721,
723-24 (1990); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring
Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 384
(1992); Craig W. Dallon, Note, Interpreting Statutes Faithfully--Not
Dynamically, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1353, 1353-54; Bruce R. Grace, Note,
Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1392, 1392-93 (1986).
2.
See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 434-43 (1985) (White,
J., dissenting); see also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 230-32 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 434-43 (White, J., dissenting); see also
3.
Lambert, 355 U.S. at 230-32 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
4.
See discussion infra notes 286-358 and accompanying text.
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courts faced with complex federal criminal statutes. s
42 U.S.C. § 6928 of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act6 (RCRA or the Act) provides a case study in
confusion.
In 1980, Congress added stepped up criminal
sanctions, making violations of the original 1976 Act felonies
rather than misdemeanors, in part to interest the FBI in
investigating violations of the act.7 The 1980 amendments made
violations of the act felonious if the acts were committed
knowingly.8 During the 1980's, panels of the Third, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits decided cases raising questions about the scope
of the mens rea term.9 The Third and Ninth Circuits came to
opposite conclusions concerning the same subsection of the Act10
while the Eleventh Circuit interpreted a related subsection in a
manner that suggested yet a third approach to the same statutory
construction problem. 11 More recently, the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits have read 42 U.S.C. § 6928 narrowly. 12
5.
See, e.g., S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1979) (known as
Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979 it contained general culpability provisions,
but was never enacted).
6.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S. C.§ 6928 (1992).
7.
See Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-482, 94 Stat. 2334 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1992)); see
also The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 3256 § 232(a)(3) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d) (1992)) (increasing criminal sanctions for conviction under § 6928( d)
from $25,000 to $50,000 for each day of violation; allowing imprisonment for
up to two years rather than one; and increasing maximum punishment for a
second conviction under §§ (d)(2) to double the fine or imprisonment term
for the first conviction).
8.
Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482,
94 Stat. 2334, 2340 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1992)).
9.
United States v. Johnson and Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir.
1983), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985);
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1083 (1990); United States v. Hayes lot '1 Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.
1986).
10.
Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 665; Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039.
11.
Hayes lnt 'I, 786 F.2d at 1502.
12.
United States v. Dee, 913 F.2d 741,745 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 St. Ct. 1307 (1990); United States v. Baytank, 934 F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir.
1991).
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In 1989, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in United States
v. Hojlin, 13 thereby missing an opportunity to resolve the
multi-circuit conflict in an area of increasing prosecutorial
interest. 14 In addition, a grant of certiorari would have given the
Supreme Court another opportunity to bring order to a recurring
problem of statutory construction that has cut across the criminal
law for decades. The problem is especially significant now
because the Court, 15 Congress, 16 and a wide array of
commentators17 have shown an increased recognition that criminal
sanctions should be reserved for culpable individuals. At the same
time, Congress and the executive have shown increased political
awareness to environmental criminal laws. 18
The proper
interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928 presents a sharp conflict
between those competing values.
This article reviews the circuit court cases interpreting 42
U.S.C. § 6928 and examines the statute's language and legislative
history. Despite the Ninth Circuit's conclusion to the contrary, the
language of the act is ambiguous. 19 The best evidence of that
fact is the array of cases interpreting similar statutes that come to

13.
Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989).
14.
See Robert I. McMurry and Stephen D. Ramsey, Environmental
Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19
LoY. LA. L. REV. 1133, 1134-45 (1986); see also Paul G. Nittoly,
Environmental Criminal Cases: The Dawn of a New Era, 21 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1125,1125-26 (1991); Judson W. Starr, Countering Environmental Crimes,
13 B. C. ENVTI... AFF. L . REV. 379, 379-84 (1986); Judith lanelli, Note,
Lessening the Mens Rea Requirement for Hazardous Waste Violations, 16 VT.
L. REV. 419, 426-34 (1991).
15.
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1985).
See 126 CONG. REC. H3367-68 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1980) (statement
16.
of Mr. Madigan).
17.
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02 commentary at 227-233 (1985); but see
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.05 commentary at 281-84 (allowing for strict liability
when the offense is a violation, the penalty for which would only be a fine).
18.
See Eva M. Fromm, Commanding Respect: Criminal Sanctions for
Environmental Crimes, 21 ST. MARY's L. J. 821, 822-23 (1990); see also
Karen M. Hansen, ''Knowing" Environmental Crimes, 16 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 987, 987 n.1 (1990); McMurray, supra note 14, at 1140-44; Starr, supra
note 18, at 380-81.
19.
See discussion infra notes 185-255 and accompanying text.
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inconsistent results. Once a statute is found ambiguous, the
Supreme Court has held, the lower court should turn to legislative
history. 20 Therefore, this article examines the legislative history
for guidance to the correct interpretation of the Act. This
legislative history is unilluminating and demonstrates that Congress
reserved to the courts the role of defining the meaning of the
language of the act. 21 In effect, Congress urged the Court to do
what it has done in this area before, i.e., to look to Supreme Court
cases that have been inconsistent and ad hoc, 22 instead of giving
clear guidance on how the act ought to be interpreted.
Therefore, this article examines the Supreme Court's general
approach to interpreting statutes that contain a "knowing" mens rea
and attempts to identify how 42 U.S.C. § 6928 might be
interpreted consistently with that line of cases. Distinct themes
emerge, though, when one examines the relevant precedent. For
example, in United States v. International Minerals & Chemical
Corp., 23 the Court interpreted a similar provision consistent with
a presumption that ignorance of the law is no defense. More
recently, however, in Liparota v. United States, 24 the Court
ignored the presumption that ignorance of law is no defense and
found more persuasive the argument that criminal conduct must be
premised on a finding of culpability.
This article addresses the tension between those two
background assumptions of the criminal law and analyzes how they
play out in a 42 U.S.C. § 6928 prosecution.25 It argues that in
light of clear developments in the criminal law over the past
several decades, the claim that ignorance of the law is no defense
is grossly exaggerated and is a much less useful guide to
interpreting criminal statutes than the abiding notion that criminal

20.
Moskal v. United States, 498 U .S. 103, 114-15 (1990); see discussion
infra notes 255-84 and accompanying text.
21.
See discussion infra notes 286-358 and accompanying text.
22.
See discussion infra notes 293-365 and accompanying text.
23.

United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.

s. 558, 563 (1971).
24.
25.

Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 434 (1985).

See discussion infra notes 359-93 and accompanying text.
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liability should be conditioned on blameworthy conduct. 26
In the past, Congress has been unable to codify federal
criminal law. v But in light of its repeated inability to draft
clearly worded statutes and to debate coherently the complex
problems addressed in federal courts, Congress should attempt the
less onerous task of adopting a general culpability provision. 28
To demonstrate the soundness of such an enterprise, this article
discusses how a provision like Model Penal Code § 2.02 would
have made more coherent and principled the lower courts' job in
the relevant cases.
Finally, this article challenges the common assumption that
strict liability is necessary to protect the environment. Failing to
allow a defendant to negate knowledge of a permit requirement
may impose criminal liability on a defendant lacking a culpable
state of mind. 29 In light of the wide array of enforcement devices
in modem federal regulatory schemes, the federal government can
pursue the legitimate goal of protecting the environment without
criminalizing non-culpable offenders. 30
II.

42 U.S.C. § 6928 OF THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND
RECOVERY ACT (RCRA)

Originally enacted in 1976, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act has been described as the "primary statute regulating
Congress designed a "cradle-to-grave"
hazardous waste. "31
system to manage and monitor hazardous waste. Specifically,
RCRA regulates the creation, storage, transportation and disposal

See discussion infra notes 359-93 and accompanying text.
See Louis B. Schwartz, Refonn of the Federal Criminal Laws:
Issues, Tactics and Prospects, 1977 DUKE L. J. 171, 174-82 (1977).
28.
See, e.g., S. 1722, %th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1979) (attempting to
26.
27.

provide a general culpability provision in a bill known as the Criminal Code
Reform Act of 1979. This bill was never enacted). See discussion supra note
5 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra notes 198-99, 240-47 and accompanying text.
29.
See discussion infra notes 394-420 and accompanying text.
30.
See Starr, supra note 14, at 386; see also Fromm, supra note 18, at
31.
825-32.
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of hazardous waste. 32
The party that creates the hazardous waste must notify the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that it has created
hazardous waste. The EPA gives the applicant an identification
number for manifesting purposes. 33 "[The] manifest is the form
used to identify the quantity, composition, origin, routing and
destination of hazardous waste during its transportation from point
of generation to the point of disposal, treatment or storage. "34 In
addition to the manifest system, a facility that "treats, stores or
disposes of hazardous waste" must obtain a permit establishing
standards for handling hazardous waste. 35
RCRA also regulates transporters of hazardous waste. 36
The firm that transports the waste to a disposal site is required to
sign the manifest. 37 It is also required to transport the waste only
to a facility that has secured the appropriate permit to dispose of
the waste. 38 That facility in tum must sign and return a copy of
the manifest to the original generator of the hazardous waste. 39
Early enforcement efforts under RCRA were primarily civil in
large part due to a lack of adequate resources and due to the lack
of significant criminal sanctions under the Act. 40 By the late
1970's federal officials and the public were made aware of "the
potential severity of the environmental danger resulting from
unscrupulous operators' illegal disposal of hazardous waste. "41
Highly publicized environmental disasters like Love Canal i_n
Niagara Falls, New York, and the Valley of Drums in

a

32.
Fromm, supra note 14, at 825.
33.
Starr, supra note 14, at 385-87.
34.
Starr, supra note 14, at 386 n.17.
35.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d)(2)(A).
36.
Starr, supra note 14, at 386 (observing that transporters of
hazardous waste are also regulated by the Dept. of Transportation).
37.
Id. at 387.
38.
Id. at 386.
39.
Id. at 387.
40.
McMurry, supra note 14, at 1138.
41.
Id.
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Shepardsville, Kentucky, increased pressure on Congress to act. 42
During hearings before Congress, for example, one federal official
testified that "(w]e do not know where the millions of tons of stuff
is going. We feel that the things that have turned up like the Love
Canal and Kin-Buc situation are simply the tip of the iceberg. We
do not have the capacity at this time really to find out what is
actually happening. "43
In 1980, Congress amended RCRA, 44 as a partial response
to the increased concern about environmental risks. 45 The
amendments were largely "fine tuning" of RCRA' s substantive
provisions. 46 The most significant change effected by the
amendments, in keeping with the increased public interest in
deterring contamination of the environment, was the increased
criminal sanctions for violations of the Act. 47
RCRA provides for a wide array of enforcement devices,
including compliance orders, civil penalties, and injunctive
relief. 48 The 1980 amendments added felony penalties which
committed the resources of the Justice Department and the FBI to
the detection and prosecution of environmental crimes. 49
According to Congressman Florio, "[o]ne of the things the Justice
Department is very interested in is getting the assistance of the FBI

42.
See 126 CONG. REC. H3345, 48 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1980)
(statement of Mr. Florio).
43.
Christopher Harris et al., Criminal Liability for Violations of Federal

Hazardous Waste Law: The Knowledge of Corporations and Their Executives,
23 WAKE FORESf L. REV. 203, 206 (1988).
44.
Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482,
94 Stat. 2334 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901(a)-(d)(1992), 6928(d)
(1992)).
See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
45.
Liability Act (Superfund), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1983); see also Harris, supra note
43, at 206.
46.
Harris, supra note 43, at 206.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
47.
96-482,94 Stat. 2334 (codified as amendment at 42 U . S. C.§ 6928(d) (1992));
see also Harris, supra note 43, at 206-07.
48.
42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1987) (current version at 42 U .S.C. § 6928
(1992)).
49.
126 CONG. REC. H3368 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1980) (statement of Mr.
Mikulski).
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in certain instances, especially interstate commerce. The FBI either
has an official policy or an unofficial policy of not becoming
involved in misdemeanors. "50 Upgrading the penalty provisions
would commit greater FBI resoures to "tracking down some of
these people. "51
Congress made criminal a variety of acts surrounding the
treating, storing, and transporting of hazardous waste.
Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) provides:
Any person who -(1) knowingly transports or causes to be
transported any hazardous waste identified or
listed under this subchapter to a facility which
does not have a permit under [relevant
provisions of federal law] . . .
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any
[specified] hazardous waste . . .
(A) without a permit under [relevant
provisions of federal law]; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material
condition or requirement of such
permit . ..
shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine
. . . or imprisonment not to exceed two
years (five years in the case of a violation of
paragraph (1) or (2)), or both.52
Congress amended the penalty provision in 1984 to increase the
fine and to provide for maximum terms of imprisonment "not to
exceed two years (five years in the case of a violation of paragraph
(1) or (2)). "53
Moreover in 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e), Congress added an

50.
Id. (statement of Mr. Florio).
Id.
51.
52.
42 u.s.c. § 6928(d) (1992).
53.
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 3257 § 232(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d) (1992)).
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enhanced criminal provision for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)
if the actor not only violated the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d), but did so with the knowledge that his violation "places
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury . . . . "54 A violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) can result in
imprisonment of up to fifteen years and/or a fine of not more than
$250,000. 55
III.

THE CONFLICTING VIEWS OF SECTION 6928(d)

42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) has been the subject of dispute in
several circuits. The Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have
interpreted the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A), making it
criminal if a person "knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any
hazardous waste . . . (A) without a permit . . . . "56 The
Eleventh Circuit has construed 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(l), making it
a crime for a person to knowingly transport hazardous waste "to
a facility which does not have a permit . . . . "57 The various
circuits have taken inconsistent approaches on the question relating
to mens rea. Three distinct positions have emerged on what the
actor must know or how far down the sentence the knowledge term
runs. 58

A.

United States v. Johnson & Towers
In United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc. ,59 the corporate

42 u.s.c. § 6928.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(e).
56.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A). See United States v. Johnson &
Towers, Inc., 742 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir. 1984), ce/1. denied sub nom. Angel v.
United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985); United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307, 1307-08 (1990); United States v.
Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d
1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990).
57. · 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A); see United States v. Hayes Int •1 Corp.,
786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986).
58.
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424-25 n.7 (1985).
59.
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir.
1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
54.

55.
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defendant owned a facility where its employees repaired large
motor vehicles. That activity generated industrial waste governed
by RCRA. 60 Johnson & Towers employees drained waste
chemicals into a holding tank, but then pumped the hazardous
waste into Parker's Creek, a tributary of the Delaware River. The
corporation had neither applied for nor obtained a permit to do, as
required by RCRA. 61
A grand jury indicted the corporation and two employees, a
foreman and a service manager in the trucking department. The
two employees were alleged to have "'managed, supervised and
directed a substantial portion of Johnson & Towers' operations .
. . including those related to the treatment, storage, and disposal
of the hazardous waste and pollutants' and that the chemicals were
discharged by 'the defendants and others at their direction. "' 62
The district court dismissed the alleged violations of 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d) on the ground that RCRA's criminal provisions
apply only to "owners and operators" of a facility. 63 The Third
Circuit reversed the district court's order and held that 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928 applied to "any person," including employees. 64 It did so
based on the plain language of the Act and on the view that a more
limited application of the Act would undermine RCRA by
exempting employees who are responsible for handling regulated
material. 65
Because the court remanded the case for trial on the section
6928(d) violations, it also addressed the mens rea question in order
to guide the lower court's interpretation of the Act. 66
As developed in more detail below, 67 the Third Circuit's
interpretation of the mens rea term is appropriate in light of the
many people who might otherwise be found in violation of the Act
without significant culpability. In other words, limiting the term

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
/d.
Id.
[d.

at 663-64.
at 664.

at 665.
at 667.

See discussion infra notes 240-47 and accompanying text.
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"person" to owners or operators would have guaranteed that the
defendant would be in a position to know about the permit
requirement and to make a reasoned business decision about
procuring a permit. By expanding the term "person, "68 the court
left open the possibility that lower eschelon employees, acting
under orders of supervisors, could be found guilty even though
they had no reason to know that a permit was required and that
one was not procured.
On the mens rea question, the government argued that all it
had to prove was that the defendant is a "person," that the
defendant handled hazardous material, and that no one had
obtained a permit for the disposal or treatment of the waste. 69
In fact, the government's position was draconian. The key
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2), provides that a person is guilty
if he "knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste
70
• • • .''
Under the government's view, the term "knowingly,"
an adverb, would modify the verbs, "treats, stores, or
disposes. "71 Presumably, almost anyone who treated or disposed
of a substance would be engaging in conduct of which he was
aware. He might not know the nature of the substance, but that
would not be required under the government's interpretation of the
Act.
A second example demonstrates how extreme the
government's position was. A defendant might be storing an
object without any knowledge of its nature. An employee at a
large facility may not know that drums of hazardous waste are
stored on the facility at all. But under the government's
interpretation of the Act, the defendant would be guilty as soon as
he knew that he was storing an object which, coincidentally,
turned out to be hazardous waste.
Under the government's view, the sweep of the Act would be
broad indeed. In the hypothetical suggested above a large
corporation might have any number of employees who had
responsibility for storing hazardous waste. They might be aware

68.
provided
69.
70.
71.

Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 665 (defining "person" to be that as
in 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15), a broad definition) .
Id. at 667.
42 u.s.c. § 6928(d)(2).
Johnson & Towers, 742 F.2d at 667.
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that something was being stored, but might have no idea what the
substance was and might not even have any reason to inquire.
Because the Third Circuit believed the term "knowingly"
would be superfluous if it modified only "treats, stores, or
disposes," it concluded that "[a]t a minimum, the word
'knowingly' . . . must also encompass knowledge that the waste
material is hazardous. "72
To that point, the Third Circuit's analysis has not produced
significant disagreement. 73 What followed though has proved to
be the most difficult issue of statutory construction. The lower
court had already found that there was no requirement that the
actor had to know that he was "acting without a permit or in
violation of the law. "74 Conceding that the Act was a public
welfare statute, the court correctly concluded that fact is not
dispositive on whether Congress intended to impose a mens rea
requirement. 75 Instead, it looked at the parallel provision of the
Act, that is, subsection 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(B) which
specifically provides that a person must knowingly treat hazardous
waste "in knowing violation of any material condition ... of such
permit. "76 It argued that it would be arbitrary to treat violators
under subsections (A) and (B) differently. The court reasoned that
Congress could not have intended to hold criminally liable those
persons who acted when no permit had been obtained irrespective
of their knowledge but not those persons who acted in violation of
the terms of a permit unless that action was knowing.77
Thus, the court concluded that "knowingly" attached to the
requirement of having a permit under section 6928(d)(2)(A).
72.
ld. at 668 (relying on United States v. Int 'I Minerals & Chern.
Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563-64 (1943)).
73.
United States v. Hayes Int •1 Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1506 (11th Cir.
1986); see also United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745-46 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1990); United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 416 (5th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U .S. 1083 (1990).
Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668 (summarizing the conclusions
74.
of the District Court).
Id. But see Hansen, supra note 18, at 1004-70.
75.
76.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(B).
n. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668.
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Specifically, on that reading, the government had to prove more
than the fact that the defendant knew that his employer stored or
disposed of waste that he knew to be hazardous. It had to prove
that the defendant knew that his employer was required to have
and did not have a permit. 78
Johnson &: Towers is not without ambiguity. For example,
in separate sections of · the opinion, the court characterizes its
holding in different ways. Thus, when first summarizing its
holding, the court stated that an employee "can be subject to
criminal prosecution only if [he] knew or should have known that
there had been no compliance with the permit requirement . . .
79
•"
But in concluding, the court stated that the district court
must instruct the jury that the defendant must have actual
knowledge. 80 The court also created potential confusion both by
holding that the government must show that the defendant knew
that a permit was required, 81 but also asserting that "under certain
regulatory statutes requiring 'knowing' conduct the government
need prove only knowledge of the actions taken and not of the
statute forbidding them. "82
Especially in light of the court's conclusion that the Act
applied to any person who treated, stored, or disposed of
hazardous waste, the court's conclusion that the term "knowingly"
would attach to all of the material elements of the offense serves
as a reasonable limitation on the possible applications of the Act.
Specifically one might envision any number of corporate

78.
ld. at 669. Sloviter, J., writing for the majority, argued that the
government's burden was lowered. However, the court characterizes the
knowledge requirement differently, id. See, e.g., id. at 664-65, holding that
"should have known" is the standard where defendant is an employee.
79.
ld. at 665 (emphasis added).
80.
ld. at 664. The Supreme Court has noted that knowledge requires
subjective awareness. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416 n.29
(1970). Not all courts make that distinction; see also Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Smith, 1961 App. Cas. 290, 327 (1960); ALI, MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02 commentary at 234 (1985) (discussing Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Smith, 1961 App. Cas. 290 (1960).
Johnson &: Towers, 741 F.2d at 669.
81.
82.
!d. at 669 (citing United States v. lot' I Minerals & Chern. Corp.,
402 u.s. 558, 563 (1971)).
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employees who literally treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste
whose conduct is not culpable. For example, a forklift driver who
stacks drums of hazardous waste in violation of the law has done
nothing blameworthy unless he has reason to know that his conduct
violates the law. 83 In many instances, the handling of hazardous
waste is socially accepted conduct -- for example, Congress has
not outlawed generation of hazardous waste. Indeed, Congress has
made some treatment and handling of hazardous waste entirely
legal as long as it is done within the terms of a permit. 84
Johnson & Towers' interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928 does
require the government to establish individual culpability in that
the actor had to be aware that his conduct was in violation of the
law. At the same time, the court underscored that, as is often the
case in a regulated industry, a jury is entitled to infer that a person
in a position of responsibility is in fact aware of regulations and
can disbelieve that person's denial of knowledge. 85

B.

United States v. Hayes International Corp.

In United States v. Hayes International, Corp. ,86 the
corporate defendant operated an airplane refurbishing plant. The
company generated two waste products covered by the Act, jet fuel
drained from planes on which work was to be performed, and a
mixture of solvents and paint resulting from the cleaning of spray
paint guns with solvents. 87
In 1981, defendant L.H. Beasley, a Hayes International
employee, contracted with an employee of Performance
Advantage, Inc., a "recycler," to remove the hazardous waste.
Performance Advantage agreed to pay Hayes International twenty
cents a gallon for the jet fuel and to remove the solvent-paint mix

83.
Proponents of strict liability generally recognize that the offender
is not culpable, but seek to justify punishment on other utilitarian grounds.
See discussion infra notes 253-54, 394-401 and accompanying text.
84.
42 u.s.c. § 6925.
85.
Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669 (citing/nt'/ Minerals, 402 U.S.
at 569).
86.
United States v. Hayes Int 'I Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
87.
/d. at 1500.
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free of charge.88
Jack Hurt, the Performance employee who negotiated the
purchase of the jet fuel, apparently told Beasley that he would take
away some of the paint waste to determine whether it could be
converted into fuel. 89 He later told Beasley that Performance did
not want the waste, but Beasley stood pat on the original deal. 90
Performance continued to accept the paint waste, but illegally
disposed of it. Government officials found about six hundred
drums deposited at seven illegal disposal sites in Georgia and
Alabama. 91
A grand jury indicted a number of individuals, including
Beasley, and the corporate defendant, Hayes International. 92
Hayes International and Beasley were charged with violating both
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A), making it unlawful to knowingly treat,
store, or dispose of hazardous waste without a permit, and 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d)(l), making it unlawful for a person to
"knowingly transportO any hazardous waste identified or listed
under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit
under [other provisions of RCRA]. "93 The district court directed
a verdict of acquittal on the 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) charge at
the close of the government's case. 94 It also set aside the jury's
verdict on the 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(l) count of the indictment and
granted a verdict of acquittal. 95 The Eleventh Circuit reversed
the district court's judgment of acquittal. 96
The issues on appeal related to RCRA' s knowledge
requirement. rn
The court addressed whether the term
"knowingly" attached to the different elements of 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d)(l). It first found that the statute did not require a showing
88.
89.
90.
91.
1986).
92.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

!d. at 1500-01.
ld.
/d. at 1506.
United States v. Hayes Int' I Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1501 (11th Cir.
Id.
42 u.s.c. § 6928(d)(1).
Hayes Int 'I, 786 F .2d at 1501 n.2.
Id. at 1500.
Id.
Id. at 1501.
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that the defendant knew of the regulations. 98 But it did hold that
the defendant had to know of the "permit status" of the facility to
which it transported hazardous waste. 99 Thus, according to the
Eleventh Circuit, to prove a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(l),
the government must prove that the "defendant knew what the
waste was (here, a mixture of paint and solvent), and that the
defendant knew the disposal site had no permit." 100 The
government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that a
permit was required. 101
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis with the relevant
legislative history. 102 As developed in more detail below, the
legislative history is singularly unilluminating. 103 In a joint
report of both houses, the Conference Committee had little to say
about the mens rea required under the Act. The Committee
summed up its views as follows:
The state of mind for all criminal violations under [the
Act] is "knowing." The conferees have not sought to
define "knowing" for offenses under subsection
[6928](d); that process has been left to the courts under

general principles." 104
The conference report disclaimed that it was defining
knowledge. 105 Technically, the problem before the court in
Hayes International and Johnson & Towers is not a question of
definition of the term. Instead, it is a question of, in the words of
the Supreme Court, how far down the sentence the term

98.
ld. at 1503.
99.
United States v. Hayes Int •I Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir.
1986).
Id. at 1505.
100.
Id. at 1503.
101.
102.
Id. at 1502.
103.
See discussion infra notes 256-84 and accompanying text.
104.
H.R. Rep. No. 1444, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 39 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 5019, 5038 note to§ 3008(£) (emphasis added).
105.
H .R. Rep. No. 1444, 96th Cong. 2nd Sess. 39, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.CA.N. 5019, 5038.

204

TULANE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6

"knowingly" runs. 106 Nonetheless, the best guidance offered by
the Conference Committee is that uncertainty about the mens rea
term should be resolved by resort to general principles. 107
The Eleventh Circuit recognized the difficulty in resorting to
the relevant Supreme Court precedent. 108 It reviewed a number
of the leading cases on point and placed reliance on United States
v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp. 109 There, the
Supreme Court construed a statute which provided that it was an
offense to "knowingly violat[e] a regulation. "110 According to
the Eleventh Circuit, International Minerals "held that knowledge
of the regulation was not an element of the offense; the use of
"knowingly" in the statute referred only to the defendant's
knowledge that the materials being shipped were dangerous. "111
The court was certainly correct that International Minerals was
relevant to its inquiry. But as developed in more detail below, 112
International Minerals' precendential value was eroded by the
more recent decision in Liparota v. United States, 113 a decision
in which the Supreme Court interpreted similar statutory language
(making it an offense for a person to "knowingly use .. . [food
stamps] in any manner not authorized by .
the
regulations, ") 114 to require proof that the defendant knew that his
conduct was unauthorized.m The Eleventh Circuit distinguished
Liparota on linguistic grounds. It found that 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(l)
made specific reference to "regulations" as an element of the

106.
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424-25, n.7 (1985)
(quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSDN W. SCOTI, JR., CRIMINAL LAW§ 27
(1st ed. 1972)).
107.
126 CONG. REC. H3345, 3368 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1980).
108.
United States v. Hayes Int' I Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502-03 (11th
Cir. 1986).
109.
Id. at 1502 (quoting United States v. Int 'I Minerals & Chern.
Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971).
Int'l Minerals, 402 U.S. at 560.
110.
111.
Hayes Int 'I, 786 F.2d at 1502 (quoting/nt 'I Minerals, 402 U .S. at

565).
112.
113.
114.
115.

See discussion infra note 340-54 and accompanying text.
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
7 u.s.c. 2024 (1992).
Liparota, 471 U .S. at 419.
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offense, unlike 42 U.S.C. § 6928 which makes reference to the
permit requirement but not to "regulations. "116 It also found that,
unlike 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) is a public
welfare statute. 117
The court did find that the government must prove that the
defendant knew whether the facility had a permit:
"the
congressional purpose indicates knowledge of the permit status is
required. The precise wrong Congress intended to combat through
[42 U.S.C. §] 6928(d) was transportation to an unlicensed facility.
Removing the knowing requirement from this element would
criminalize innocent COnduct . . . . "118
At this juncture, Hayes International deviated from the
approach taken by the Third Circuit in Johnson & Towers. The
Third Circuit specifically required a showing that the defendant
knew that the company had to have a permit and that, in fact, it
did not have one. The Eleventh Circuit found only that the
government had to show that the defendant knew that the company
to which hazardous waste was transported did not have a permit,
not that it was required to have one. 119
The Eleventh Circuit found that criminal liability under
RCRA did not require knowledge of the regulation because 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d) is a public welfare statute and, therefore, "it is
completely fair and reasonable to charge those who choose to
operate in such areas with knowledge of the regulatory
provisions. "120 The Eleventh Circuit insisted, however, that the
government must establish that the defendant knew that the facility
had no permit. It did so because to hold otherwise would be to
criminalize innocent conduct. 121 Its example demonstrates one
instance where innocent conduct might be criminalized: "for
example, if the defendant reasonably believed that the site had a

116.
1986).
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
1986).

United States v. Hayes Int 'I Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir.

!d.
Id. at 1504.
Id. at 1504-05.
Id. at 1503.
United States v. Hayes Int •I Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir.
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permit, but in fact had been misled by the people at the site . . .
11122

The only way to give coherence to the Eleventh Circuit's
position (i.e., that the Act must be read to avoid criminalizing
innocent conduct and so must be read to require that a defendant
knew that the facility lacked a permit, but that a defendant does
not have to know that a permit is required) 123 is to engage in the
court's presumption that anyone in the business must be aware of
the regulations. 124
In some areas of the law, such a presumption certainly makes
sense. For example, the common law's traditional resistance to
recognizing ignorance of the law as a defense may at least in part
be explained by our unwillingness to believe a suspect's claim that
he was unaware that theft or robbery was illegal. 125 There, an
irrebuttable presumption arises that the defendant knew the law
would be logical. It is less clear that such a presumption should
be, in effect, irrebuttable in the area of environmental law .126
The Eleventh Circuit did not give examples of whether innocent
conduct might be criminalized if the government need not prove
the defendant's knowledge of the permit requirement. But such
examples are not hard to come by. In light of the broad meaning
of the term "person, "127 for example, a recently hired truck
driver with little or no training about industry regulations may
violate the act by knowingly transporting what he knows to be
hazardous waste and when asked, he may know that he has not
inquired whether the facility has a permit. 128 It is doubtful that
such a person should be presumed to know that a permit is
required. Hence, under the Eleventh Circuit's approach, it is not

122.
!d. at 1504.
123.
!d.
124.
!d. at 1503 (insisting that its reading of RCRA is consistent with
fairness, as well as with congressional intent).
See People v. 0 'Brien, 31 P. 45 (Cal. 1892); see also GLANVILLE
125.
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART,§ 102 at 291 (2d ed. 1961).
126.
See discussion infra notes 366-90 and accompanying text.
127.
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662,664-65 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 {1985).
128.
Hayes Int 'I, 786 F.2d at 1504 n.6.
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hard to conceive of examples in which morally innocent conduct
might well be criminalized by holding that knowledge of the
permit requirement is not an essential element of the offense. 129
Both Johnson & Towers and Hayes International underscored
that the government's burden of proof was hardly insurmountable,
given the variety of inferences that the jury would be permitted to
draw based on, for example, the failure to follow certain
procedures. 130 Proof of knowledge of the requirement of having
a permit would be subject to similar proof. For example, the jury
would almost certainly be entitled to infer knowledge of the
regulation from the fact that a person has a position of
responsibility in a regulated company. 131 Instead, the position of
the Eleventh Circuit treats knowledge of the regulation as an
irrebuttable presumption. 132 Treating it merely as an inference
would not significantly impair environmental interests because the
inference would most likely be convincing when the defendant was
in a position of control.
C.

United States v. Hojlin

In United States v. Hojlin, 133 Douglas Hoflin, the Director
of Public Works Department for Ocean Shores in Washington
state, was convicted on one count of aiding and abetting the
disposal of hazardous waste in violation of 42 U.S.C. §

129.
One reason might be that we can trust prosecutor's discretition
to avoid bringing charges against non-culpable offenders. See Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225, 230 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Apart from
the questionable merit of that argument generally, it seems especially
questionable in this context because of the political interest in using the
criminal law to combat environmental degradation. See, e.g., Fromm, supra
note 18, at 822. Hansen, supra note 18, at 987 n.l.; McMurry, supra note 14,
at 1140-44; Starr, supra note 14, at 380-81.
130.
Hayes Int 'I, 786 F.2d at 1504-05 n.8.
131.
Compare with United States v. Int' I Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402
u.s. 558, 565 (1971).
132.
Hayes Int 'I, 786 F.2d at 1502-03.
133.
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cerl. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
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6928(d)(2)(A). 134 The charge arose out of his responsibility for
supervising the community's roads.
During a seven year period, Ocean Shores purchased 3,500
gallons of paint for painting roadways. At one point in 1982,
unused paint was stored indoors in one of the department's
buildings. The fire marshal ordered that the drums be removed
and stored outdoors. 135
The government's proof at trial amply demonstrated that
Hoflin knew that the liquid was flammable. For example, the
shipping documents and the drums both indicated that the material
was flammable. 136 For at least one shipment, Hoflin signed the
bill of lading which identified the contents as flammable
liquid. 137
Despite that knowledge, Hoflin ordered the public works yard
cleaned up and the excess paint buried at the community's sewage
treatment plant. The director of the plant warned him that to do
so would be in violation of the law. 138 Hoflin then directed one
employee to transport the drums to the treatment plant and another
to bury the drums. 139
The director of the treatment plant reported the incident to an
official of the state Department of Ecology, who in turn reported
it to the EPA. 140 The EPA's investigation uncovered fourteen
drums buried on the premises, ten of which contained liquid.

134.
Defendant-Appellant's Opening Brief at 1, United States v.
Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 86-3071), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1143 (1990). Hollin was also charged with a felony violation of 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d)(2)(A) for conspiring with others to dispose of hazardous waste
without having obtained a permit from the EPA and convicted of a
misdemeanor for violation of 33 U .S.C. § 1319(c)(1) for aiding and abbeting
the burial of sludge.
135.
Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1035 (demonstrating defendant's knowledge
of flammability) .
136.
Brief for the Appellee at 8, United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033
(9th Cir. 1989) (No. 86-3071), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
137.
ld. at 7.
138.
ld. at 9.
139.
ld.
140. Id. at 6-7
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Paint had leaked out of several drums and had penetrated the
soil.141
Hoflin admitted that he knew that the diposal of hazardous
waste was regulated by a permit system under an environmental
agency. His defense was based on a claim that he did not know
that the traffic paint, especially the solidified paint, was
hazardous. 142
Hoflin appealed his conviction based on the trial court's
refusal to give his proposed jury instructions on the necessary
elements of 42 U.S.C. § 6928. 143 He submitted the following
jury instruction:
To establish the crime charged, the government must prove
four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. That the defendant knowingly disposed of
certain material;
2. That he did so knowing the material was
"hazardous waste;"
3. That the defendant acted knowing that the burial
of these materials required a permit from the
Environmental Protection Agency; and
4. That he knew no permit had been obtained. 144
In most details, Hoflin was requesting a jury instruction consistent
with the holding in Johnson & Towers. 145
The Ninth Circuit rejected Hoflin's claim. 146 It found that
the statutory language was unambiguous. 147
It based its

141.
Brief for the Appellee at 10, United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d
1033 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 86-3071), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
142.
ld. at 11.
143.
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
144.
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
Id. at 1037. The only difference between the instructions
145.
requested in Hof/in and Johnson & Towers is that Hoflin added a specific
reference to the EPA.
146.
Id. at 1038.
147.
Id. at 1037.
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argument on the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A), the offense
with which Hoflin was charged, contained the term "knowingly"
in subsection (2}, but not in subsection (A). 14s By contrast,
subsection (2)(B) contains the term "knowing. " 149 Thus, if a
person is charged under 42 U.S.C § 6928(d)(2)(B), the
government must prove that he knowingly treated a hazardous
waste (B) in knowing violation of a material condition of a permit.
A person who "knowingly" treats a hazardous waste is guilty
under subsection (A) merely if the act is done without having
obtained a permit. That is, the Ninth Circuit found that neither
knowledge of the permit requirement or that of the fact that no
permit had been obtained was an element of the offense. 150
The Ninth Circuit found that the Act's language did not
support contrary result. "To read the word 'knowingly' at the
beginning of section (2) into subsection (A) would be to eviscerate
this distinction [between subsections (A) and (B)]. Thus, it is
plain that knowledge of the absence of a permit is not an element
of the offense defined by subsection (A). "151
The court specifically rejected the Third Circuit's approach
in Johnson & Towers. 152 It did so largely on its finding that the
statute was unambiguous: "Had Congress intended knowledge of
the lack of a permit to be an element under subsection (A) it easily
could have said so. It specifically inserted a knowledge element
in subsection (B), and it did so notwithstanding the 'knowingly'
modifier which introduces subsection (2). "153
Johnson &
Towers' approach, according to the Ninth Circuit, would make the
knowing term in (B) surplusage. 154
Despite its conclusion that the meaning of the language was
plain, the court also found that its reading of the Act was
consistent with the underlying purpose of RCRA. It found that the

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 1037.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(B).
Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038-39.
ld. at 1037.
Id. at 1038.
Id.
Id.
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Act was, in effect, a public welfare measure. tss
Unlike the Third Circuit in Johnson & Towers, the Ninth
Circuit found that its interpretation, distinguishing between
violators charged under subsections (A) and (B), was not illogical.
It found rational a distinction between handlers of hazardous waste
who had obtained a permit but who were acting in violation of its
conditions and those who had not notified the EPA that they were
handling hazardous waste at all. 1s6 In effect, it found a handler
of hazardous waste who did not notify the government more
culpable because the failure to do so makes it that much more
difficult for the agency to perform its obligation. 157
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Hoflin' s contention that the
government must prove that "the defendant knew the material
being disposed of was hazardous. ntss The court found that
"knowingly" modified not only "treats, stores, or disposes of," but
also hazardous waste. 159 The charge given by the trial court
stated that the jury had to find that the defendant "knew the
chemical waste had the potential to be harmful to others or to the
environment. "160 Although that charge did not state explicitly
that the defendant had to know that the substance was hazardous,
the court found that the instruction conveyed the idea
sufficiently. 161

D.

United States v. Dee

In 1990, the Fourth Circuit followed the lead of the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Dee. 162 There, the government
charged engineers, civilian employees of the United States Army,
155.
United States v. H oflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
156.
Id. at 1038-39.
157.
ld.
158.
Id. at 1039.
159.
Id.
160.
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
161.
/d.
162.
United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745-46 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1990).
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with multiple violations under the RCRA. The defendants headed
departments at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. 163
That facility had a RCRA permit, but the defendants permitted the
storage of the hazardous waste in an area not covered by the
RCRA permit. 164
The Fourth Circuit did not engage in extensive analysis of the
statutory construction problem. It rested the decision largely on
the now familiar citation to International Minerals to the effect that
"ignorance of the law is no defense, "165 and on the Eleventh
Circuit's holding in Hayes International and the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Hojlin. 166 As in Hojlin, the Fourth Circuit held that
the government has to establish only "knowledge of the general
hazardous character of the wastes. " 167 In Dee, the trial court
instructed the jury incorrectly that the government had to .prove
that the defendants knew that the substances were chemicals, not
that the chemicals were hazardous. The court found the erroneous
instruction harmless. 168

E.

United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc.

In 1991, the Fifth Circuit upheld the conv1ct10n of a
corporate defendant on two counts of improper storage of
hazardous waste in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) and
reversed the district court's grant of judgments of acquittal in favor
of two individual defendants on the two RCRA counts. 169
Baytank, a bulk liquid chemical storate facility, and the individual
defendants, an executive vice president and a safety manager, 170
violated 42 U.S.C. § 6928 by storing hazardous waste at Baytank's

Id. at 743-44.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 745 (citing United States v. Int 'I Minerals & Chern. Corp.,
402 u.s. 558, 563 (1971)).
166.
Id.
167.
United States v. Dee, 912 F. 2d 741, 745 (1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 1307 (1990).
168.
!d.
169.
United States v. Baytank, 934 F.2d 599, 602 (4th Cir. 1991).
170.
!d. at 603.
163.
164.
165.
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facility in Seabrook, Texas, a facility without a permit as required
by RCRA.
On appeal, Baytank challenged the exclusion of a requested
instruction that the jury had to find not only that the EPA had
identified the particular waste as hazardous, but also that the
defendants knew that fact. 171 Consistent with Hojlin, the lower
court did instruct that the prosecutor had to prove that the
defendants knew that the waste was hazardous. 172 In light of that
instruction, the Fifth Circuit rejected Baytank's claim that an
innocent person might be convicted of a felony under the
government's theory of the case. 173
The Fifth Circuit characterized Baytank's claim as a defense
of ignorance of law and relied on International Minerals' narrow
reading of the mens rea requirement in cases involving dangerous
substances. 174 It also relied on the result reached in other
circuits to support its conclusion that "knowledge" does not attach
to the fact that the EPA has classified the substance as
hazardous. 175
In relief on Hayes International, the court distinguished
Liparota.
The Fifth Circuit found Baytank' s proposed
interpretation less readily suggested by 42 U.S.C. § 6928's
statutory language than the language involved in Liparota. 176
The Fifth Circuit also relied on the suggestion in dicta in Liparota
that offenses involving the community's health and safety are
public welfare offenses, in which case the more begrudging
statutory analysis in International Minerals controls. 177 Finally,
it declined to follow Johnson & Towers' contrary suggestion that
knowledge of the regulations is an essential element of a RCRA
offense. 178
Thus after eight years of litigation in several federal circuits,

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 612.
/d.
/d.
United States v. Baytank, 934 F.2d 599, 602 (4th Cir. 1991).
/d., specifically relying on Hoflin, Dee, and Hayes Int '/.
/d. at 613.
/d.
/d.
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three distinct interpretations of 42 U.S.C. § 6928 have emerged.
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits interpretation, which is the most
restrictive, requires only that the defendant know that the substance
is hazardous. 179 The Eleventh Circuit requires no showing of the
defendant's knowledge that a permit must be secured, but does
require a showing of defendant's knowledge that no permit has
been secured. 180 The Third Circuit requires the additional
knowledge of the permit requirement. 181
IV. THE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO CONSTRUE A STATUTE
All of the courts that have considered the construction of 42
U.S.C. § 6928 have implicitly agreed on the appropriate steps of
the court's inquiry! 82 The starting point is the language of the
Act. If it is found unambiguous, the court should have no
recourse to legislative history. 183 If the language is ambiguous,
then the court may have recourse to the legislative history . 184 If
the history is inconclusive, the court should look to background
assumptions governing the criminal law. 185 Absent evidence to
the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that Congress would act

179.
See United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1307 (1990); United States v. Hoflin 880 F.2d 1033, 1038-39 (9th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
180.
United States v. Hayes Int' 1 Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1504-05 (11th
Cir. 1986).
181.
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3rd
Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U .S. 1208 (1985).
182.
See discussion supra notes 54-179 and accompanying text.
183.
See Carninetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917) (holding
that defendant's act of transporting a willing girl to another state for the
purpose of having sexual relations violated the plain meaning of the Mann
Act, and therefore was not subject to any alternative interpretation by the
Court); see also REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
OF STA1UI'ES, 229-33 (1975); SINGER, NORMAN, 2A Sl!THERIAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed., 1992).
184.
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,424-25 (1985) (researching
the legislative history after finding the statute in question to be ambiguous).
185.
See id. at 427 (applying the doctrine of lenity after finding the
congressional purpose unclear).
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consistently with those background assumptions. 186
Consistency ends with the general agreement of the relevant
steps of inquiry. Thereafter, the various circuits interpreting 42
U.S.C. § 6928 agree upon little.

A.

Is 42 U.S.C § 6928 Unambiguous?

1.

The meaning of "person"

42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) creates two offenses. Subsection (A)
makes it an offense if "[a]ny person ... knowingly treats, stores,
or disposes of any [specific] hazardous waste . .. without [having
obtained] a permit." 187 Subsection (B) makes it an offense if
"any person . . . knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any
[specified] hazardous waste . . . in knowing violation of any
material condition or requirement of such permit. "188 Most of
the litigation addressing these sections has focused on whether
"knowingly" attaches to different elements of the offense,
specifically whether it attaches to the fact that the waste was
hazardous and to the fact that a permit is required. Since Johnson
&: Towers, the meaning of "person" has received little
attention. 189 But in assessing the literal or unambiguous meaning
of 42 U.S.C. § 6928, Johnson &: Towers miscontrued the term
"person," leading to some of the uncertainty about the meaning of
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A).

186.

See id.; see also United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chern. Corp.,

u.s. 558, 563 (1971).
187.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A).
188.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(B).
189.
The meaning of "person" was raised in United States v. Dee, 912
F.2d 741, 744 (4th Cir. 1990). The court held that federal employees were
"persons" and that sovereign immunity does not apply to individual
government employees so as to immunize them from prosecutions from their
criminal acts, id. at 744. Other defendants prosecuted under 42 U.S.C. § 6928
have not raised this issue. See also United States v. Sellers, 926 F. 2d 410 (5th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990); United States v. Hayes Int' 1 Corp., 786 F.2d 1499
(11th Cir. 1986).
402
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As discussed above, 190 the Third Circuit reversed the
district court's order dismissing the indictment in Johnson &:
Towers. The district court found that "person" in 42 U.S.C. §
6928 applied only to "owners and operators" of a facility. 191
Instead, the Third Circuit gave a literal interpretation to the term
"person," i.e., that it applied to any person, including employees.
In addition to the plain meaning of the Act, the Third Circuit also
found that its reading of the term "person" would further the
regulatory goals of the Act. 192
While an employee is obviously a "person" within the literal
meaning of that term, the Third Circuit ignored the context in
which the term "person" is used in 42 U.S.C. § 6928. Johnson&:
Towers dealt with employees charged under subsection (2)(A);
specifically, the employees were charged with knowingly treating,
storing, or disposing of hazardous waste "without having obtained
a permit" under relevant provisions of federal law. 193 Apart
from whether "knowingly" attaches to the permit requirement, 194
a close reading of subsection (2)(A) denotes that a violator under
this subsection is one who had a duty to obtain a permit. The
complex nonfinite verb phrase "having obtained" requires a
subject, a person who must do the obtaining. This follows from
a fundamental rule of grammar that every verb must have a
subject. The subject literally would appear to be the person who
knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of the hazardous waste -there is no other person or grammatically possible agent of the
action mentioned who could violate subsection (2)(A) other than
the one who was supposed to obtain the permit but failed to do so.
Elsewhere in the Act, Congress specified that owners and
operators are the people responsible for obtaining the permit. 195
Thus, paraphrased, the plain meaning of subsection (A) would
appear to be as follows: A person, who is obligated to obtain a

190.
See discussion supra notes 57-83 and accompanying text.
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664 (3rd
191.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985) .
!d. at 666.
192.
193.
!d. at 664.
194.
!d. at 665.
195.
42 u.s.c. § 6925 (1992).
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permit, specifically an owner/operator, who fails to do so, is guilty
of an offense if he treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous
waste.
The government's argument in Johnson & Towers that
subsection (d) applies to any person who treats, stores, or diposes
of hazardous waste ignores subsection (A)'s requirement that the
person must be one who had a duty to obtain a permit. 196 The
government's position found support in a statement in the
legislative history. In the House Committee's discussion of the
Act, it states that "[t]his section also provides for criminal
penalties for the person who . . . disposes of any hazardous waste
without a permit under this title. " 197 That is not the language
used by Congress; that interpretation ignores the phrase "without
having obtained" and would leave "having obtained" without a
subject.
Contrary to the assertion in Johnson & Towers, 198 a
syntactically correct reading of the Act would not have undercut
RCRA's enforcement goals. The term "person" would not be
similarly limited in subsection (d)(2)(B) of the Act.
That
provision, properly read, would apply to any person who
knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of hazardous waste in
knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such
permit. Subsection (B) would appear to apply to those employees
in a position to implement the requirements of the permit.
That reading of the Act is syntactically correct. At first
blush, it creates an anomalous result. Subsection (A) would
criminalize only operators and owners who failed to get a permit,
not their employees. By contrast, once an employer obtained a
permit, the Act would criminalize any employee who knowingly
violated the permit. 199
The result is in fact not anomalous. Consider the reality of
the workplace. Employees are neither required to obtain the permit

196.
Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 665.
197.
H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 30, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.CA.N. 6238,6269.
198.
Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 667.
199.
See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F. 2d 1033, 1038-39 (9th Cir.
1989}, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990} (finding that result anomalous).
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nor, presumably, empowered to do so by the law. It seems
draconian to impose criminal liability on an employee for
continuing to perform the job for which he has been hired when he
is powerless to change those conditions. That is especially
draconian if, as insisted by the Ninth Circuit, he may be found
guilty without even a showing that he knew that there was a permit
requirement. 200
Once the permit is obtained, employees have a defense if
they did not know of the permit's material conditions. 201 Their
criminal liability is only for knowing violations. That liability is
hardly draconian; it must be based on a showing of a knowing
violation of a material condition or requirement of the permit.
Limiting 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) liability to those charged
with the responsibility of procuring the permit keeps the criminal
sanctions within rational limits based on culpable conduct. This
is especially true if subsection (d)(2)(A) is read not to require
knowledge of the permit requirement. In that context, any number
of employees may transport, store, or dispose of hazardous waste
for a company that has not secured a permit. Many of them may
lack knowledge that there is a permit requirement or that the
company is obligated to have one; further, they may be in no
position to influence the employer's decision to violate the law.
2.

The scope of "knowingly"

42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) provides that a person commits
an offense if he knowingly treats, stores or disposes of any
hazardous waste without having obtained a permit. 202 As often
has been the case with federal statutes, courts have to decide
200.
/d. at 1037; see also Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664-65. While
the lower court treated employees as mere accomplices, holding that they
could be charged as aiders and abettors under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) without
any mention of a mens rea requirment, the appellate court allowed
prosecution of employees as principal offenders under 42 U.S.C. § 6928, but
added the requirement that criminal prosecution is available only if they knew
or should have known that there had been no compliance with the permit
requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 6925.
201.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(B).
202.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A).

1993]

DOES CULPABILITY MAITER?

219

among competing interpretations of the same language.
Specifically, the "knowingly" term may attach to a number of
different material elements.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) allows four interpretations. First,
"knowingly" may only attach to "treats, stores, or disposes." One
would be guilty of an offense if the prosecutor demonstrated only
that the actor knew that she was treating, storing, or disposing of
a substance and that the substance was hazardous and that no
permit had been obtained. Second, "knowingly" may attach to
the verbs and in addition may attach to the hazardous nature of the
substance. That is, a person would be guilty of an offense if the
prosecutor demonstrated not only knowledge that one was, for
example, disposing of a substance, but also knew that the
substance was hazardous. If that were the correct reading of the
Act, it would be necessary to demonstrate that no permit was
obtained. But the prosecutor would not have to show that the
offender knew that the permit had not been obtained or that there
was a permit requirement.
Third, "knowingly" may attach to the verbs, to the fact that
the substance was hazardous, and to the fact that no permit was
obtained, but not to the requirement that a permit be obtained.
Fourth, "knowingly" may attach to all of the elements, including
the permit requirement. In such a case, the prosecutor would have
to demonstrate that the defendant knew that he was, for example,
storing what he knew was hazardous waste and that he knew that
a permit was required and that no permit had been acquired.
No court to date has adopted the first interpretation, although
that was the position argued by the government in Johnson &
Towers. 203 The Ninth Circuit adopted the second position; 204
the Eleventh Circuit in the related context of 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d)(1), in effect, adopted the third approach.205 The Third
Circuit adopted the fourth position. 206 That suggests that the

203.
Johnson & Towers, 741 F. 2d at 668 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied
sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
204.
Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039.
205.
United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th
Cir. 1986).
Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664-65.
206.
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language is ambiguous. Despite that fact, the Ninth Circuit found
the language to be unambiguous.
Initially, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion concerning the scope
of the term "knowingly" is supported by traditional rules of
grammar.
A grammarian would describe the appropriate
construction of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) as follows: "knowingly"
would be a predication adjunct; as such, it would modify all of the
requisite features of the predication. 207 Because "treat," "store,"
and "disposes of' are all transitive verbs (i.e., verbs requiring a
direct object), the direct object, "waste," is a requisite feature of
the predication. 208 Additionally, because "hazardous" restricts
the meaning of "waste," "hazardous" is also a requisite
feature.209 Hence, all of these terms must fall within the scope
of "knowingly."
That is not the case with subclauses (A) and (B). They
would be sentence adjuncts insofar as they modify the entire
independent clause, "Any person .. . waste." They, therefore, do
not fall within the scope of the adverb in that clause,
"knowingly. "210
What the Ninth Circuit's approach ignores is that the
Supreme Court has not adopted the rules of grammar as the
controlling rules for statutory construction. In a number of
instances, the Supreme Court has addressed grammatical
constructions parallel to that in 42 U.S.C. § 6928 and come to
inconsistent results concerning the scope of the "knowingly" term.
In Morissette v. United States, 211 the defendant was accused
of violating 18 U.S. C. § 641 , providing in relevant part that
"[w]hoever . . . knowingly converts to his use . . . anything of
value of the United States . . . "212 is guilty of a crime. In

207.
See, e.g., RANDOLF QUIRK ET AL., A COMPREHENSIVE GRAMMAR
OF THE ENGLISH lANGUAGE § 8.25, at 504-10 (1985). I am especially
appreciative of Dr. Robert Chaim' s help with the analysis of this point.
208.
Id. at 508-10.
209.
Id. at 508.
210.
Id. at 511.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 248 (1952).
211.
212.
18 U.S.C. § 641 (1951) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1992)).
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United States v. International Miner:als, 213 the Court must
determine the elements to which "knowingly" attached in 18
U.S.C. § 834, making it an offense for a person to "knowingly
violate any ... regulation" formulated by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. 214 In United States v. Yermian, 215 the Court had
to decide whether the government had to prove that the defendant
knew that the matter was within the jurisdiction of a federal
agency to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which
provides that "[w]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of
any department or agency of the United States knowingly and
willfully ... makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements.
216
• •"
shall be guilty of an offense. And more recently, the
Supreme Court interpreted similar language in Liparota v. United
States, 217 where it had to interpret the following language:
"Whoever knowingly uses, tranfers, acquires, alters, or posesses
coupons ... in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the
regulations" 218 shall be guilty of a criminal offense.
The language in each of the cited provisions is parallel. In
each, the mens rea term, "knowingly," is placed near the
beginning of the sentence.
If the rules of grammar were controlling, in the case of 18
U.S.C. § 641, for example, the government would have to prove
that a defendant knew he was converting something of value, that
it had value, and that it was the property of the United States.
That would be the case because "knowingly," a predication
adjunct, would modify the transitive verb "converts" and its direct
object, "anything of value of the United States. "219
In the case of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the government would have
to prove that a matter was within the jurisdiction of a Department
or Agency of the United States, but not have to prove that the

213.
(1971).
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

United States v. Int 'I Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 560
18 U.S.C. § 834 (1971) (repealed 1979).
United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984).
ld. at 68 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1992)).
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
7
§ 2024(b)(1) (1985).
See QUIRK, supra note 207, at 509-10.

u.s.c.
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defendant knew that it was. Instead, it would have to prove only
that he was making a statement and that the statement was false.
"[I]n any matter within the jurisdiction of any department . .
220
•"
is a sentence adjunct221 and would not be within the scope
of the mens rea terms, "knowingly and willfully."
By contrast, the rules of grammar would require the
government to prove not only a knowing act, but knowledge of the
regulations in 18 U.S.C. § 834. That is so because, as
demonstrated above, the adverb "knowingly" includes within its
scope the direct object of the transitive verb.222 In 18 U.S. C. §
834, "violates" is a transitive verb and "any regulation" is its
direct object. 223
Finally, in the case of 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(l), the
government would have to prove that the offender knowingly
transferred or acquired or posessed what he knew to be coupons.
That is so because "coupons" is the direct object of the transitive
verbs, hence within the scope of "knowingly." But "in any
manner not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations" would be
a sentence adjunct and not within the scope of the adverb.224
Even a cursory review of what the Supreme Court actually
held in the relevant cases demonstrates that the Court has not tied
statutory construction to the rules of grammar. Yennian was
decided consistently with the rules of grammar. There, the Court
held that the government did not have to prove that the defendant
knew that the matter was within the jurisdiction of a federal
agency.225 Although the Court's analysis was consistent with
traditional grammatical rules, the Congress, at least according to
the dissent's reading of congressional history , did not intend the
traditional rules to apply. 226
Other than in Yennian, however, the Court's holdings were
not consistent with the results based on a close grammatical

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

18

u.s.c. § 1001 (1992).

See

QUIRK,

supra note 207, at 511-12.

/d. at 508-10.

!d.
!d. at 508-14.
United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 68-70 (1984).
!d. at 76-77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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reading of the statute. In Morissette, the Court did hold that the
govenment had to prove that the defendant knew that the property
was that of another. 227 But there is no indication in the Court's
decision that it would have to prove that an accused knew that the
property was the property of the United States. Unlike legal, as
opposed to grammatical analysis, that the property belonged to the
United States would almost certainly be jurisdictional,228 not a
material element to which a mens rea term would attach.
International Minerals and Liparota provide a perfect
contrast to the Court's statutory construction and the rules of
grammar. Whereas rules of grammar would place the regulations
within the scope of "knowingly" in International Minerals, the
Court held that the government had to show only that the
defendant knew the nature of the thing shipped. 229 By contrast,
in Liparota, the Court held that the government had to prove that
the defendant knew that he was violating the regulations. 230
Application of the rules of grammar would have produced a
contrary result. 231
While the Ninth Circuit's construction of 42 U.S.C. § 6928
is consistent with rules of grammar, it is hard to argue that the
language of the Act is not ambiguous. Unless courts simply do
not understand the rules of grammar, the inconsistent construction
given similar syntax demonstrates that the syntax can support
different interpretations. The American Law Institute explicitly
identified the ambiguity in criminal statutes and drafted Model
Penal Code § 2.02(4) to deal with that question. 232 Specifically,
the drafters commented that "[s]ubsection [2.02](4) is addressed to
a pervasive ambiguity in definitions of offenses that include a
culpability requirement, namely, that it is often difficult to
determine how many of the elements of the offense the

227.
228.
229.
64 (1971).
230.
231.
232.

Morissette v. United States, 342 U .S. 246, 270 (1952).
See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676 (1975).
United States v. Int' I Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558,563Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 434 (1985).
See discussion supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (Prop. Off. Draft 1962).
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requirement is meant to modify. "233
The Model Penal Code solution rejects the rules of grammar.
Instead, "[s]ubsection (4) provides that if the definition is not
explicit on the point, as by prescribing different kinds of
culpability for different elements, the culpability statement will
apply to all the elements, unless a contrary purpose plainly
appears. "234 Given the specialized use of language in the law,
especially in the criminal law, statutory construction can
appropriately abandon ordinary rules of grammar when those rules
would produce results inconsistent with the underlying premises of
the criminal law. 235
The Ninth Circuit found additional textual support for its
view that 42 U.S.C. § 6928 was unambiguous in subsections (A)
and (B). The Ninth Circuit argued that the inclusion of the mens
rea term in subsection (B) demonstrated that Congress could easily
have included a knowledge element in (A) and that its failure to
do so clearly evidenced its intent that knowledge did not attach to
the permit requirement. 236 That argument is plausible. But the

233.
MODEL P ENAL CODE § 2.02 commentary at 228 (1985). See also
id. at 245. The draftsmen of the Wisconsin Legislature posed the problem in
these terms: "When, for example, a statute says that it is unlawful to 'willfully,
maliciously, or wantonly destroy, remove, throw down or injure any [property]
upon the land of another,' do the words denoting the requirement of intent
apply only to the doing of the damage or do they also modify the phrase
• upon the land of another, ' thus requiring knowledge or belief that the
property is located upon land that belongs to another?"
234.
!d. at 228. Analyzed under 2.02(4), Yennian, Morissette, and
Liparota would be correctly decided. In Yennian, placement of the phrase "in
any matter ... would indicate a clear intent not to attach the mens rea term
to that provision." In Morissette, "knowingly'' would attach to the status of the
property, but not to the ownership by the United States. Presumably under
§ 1.13(10), the role of the U .S. is jurisdictional. As developed below, in
Liparota, Justice Brennan was influenced by the Model Penal Code.
For example, criminal statutes are usually strictly construed to
235.
assure the actor with fair warning what conduct is punishable. See, e.g., United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); State v. Stockton, 647 P.2d 21, 24
(Wash. 1982); DICKERSON, supra note 183, at 209.
236.
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
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court insisted that rendered the statute unambiguous. 237 In part,
it did so because it found meaningful the two categories of
defendants created by its reading of the statute. It found a
distinction that the legislature would rationally have intended,
therefore, not rendering the statute arbitrary or irrational. 238
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the two categories found in 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d) by reference to the general goals of the Act.
The Court identified those goals as preventing "the grave danger
to people and the environment from hazardous wastes. "239 The
millions of tons of waste represent a significant threat to human
welfare, but much of the waste is "generated and buried without
notice until the damage becomes evident. "240 Thus, one of the
major goals of the legislation is tracking the hazardous waste from
creation through disposal. Defendants under (B) are those who
have secured a permit and violate its conditions. They have
lessened the EPA's burden by notifying the agency, making the
monitoring of the hazardous waste easier. Defendants under (A)
are those who have hidden their activity from the EPA, making the
Agency's task of monitoring hazardous waste more difficult. 241
That knowledge is required in subsection (B) is hardly
surprising. Without requiring knowledge (or some mens rea) that
the person is treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste
inconsistent with a permit would criminalize a good deal of
innocent behavior. For example, a person who knows that he is
disposing of what he knows to be hazardous waste, but does so in
the good faith reasonable belief that he is doing so consistent with
the conditions of the permit is hardly blameworthy. The
underlying conduct is not mala in se. After all, the government
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Id. at 1038.
Id.
240.
Id.
241.
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). There is an element of circularity in the
Ninth Circuit ' s argument. It is supporting its assertion that the act is
unambiguous by reference to what Congress might have intended. But if the
language is unambiguous, intent becomes irrelevant. Ironically, there is
evidence that Congress had no such disitinction in mind. See discussion infra
notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
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has not outlawed disposing or treating or storing hazardous waste.
It has merely controlled them by a permit system. 242
What is open to question is whether the same might not be
said about a violator under subsection (A). For example, one can
conceive of any number of people who treat, store, or dispose of
what they know to be hazardous waste without knowing of a
permit requirement. What about the various employees of the
Public Works Department who had responsibility for disposing of
the paint drums in Hojlin? 243 Or what about a defendant who in
fact safely stores hazardous waste but simply is unaware of the
permit requirement? Treating, storing, and disposing of hazardous
waste is not necessarily criminal activity. 244 The creation of
hazardous waste has gone on for years and the handling of
hazardous waste has sometimes created harm, but not always. 245
That is, the underlying conduct is not necessarily criminal. Under
the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, those offenders come within the
terms of the statute, but their failure to know that there is a permit
requirement hardly makes their conduct culpable.
The pivotal premise to the Ninth Circuit's position was the
view shared at times by the Supreme Court that "[w]here . . .
dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste
materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that
anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing
with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation. "246
That presumption seems rational and would certainly be a

242.
42 u.s.c. § 6925.
243.
See, e.g., Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1035.
244.
42 U.S.C. § 6925 establishes a permit system; it does not outlaw
the underlying conduct.
See PAUL N. CHEREMISINOFF & FRED ELLERBUSCH, RESOURCE
245.
CONSERVATION & RECOVERY Acr, A SPECIAL REPORT 2 (1979) (providing
a history of solid waste legislation efforts since 1899); see also EDWARD H.
RABIN & MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ, THE POLLUTION CRISIS: OFFICIAL
DocuMENTS 6-7 (1972) (giving an example of how some pollutants will
eventually decompose and diffuse throughout the environment, while others
which resist decomposition may be toxic and pose serious health dangers).
246.
Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038 (quoting United States v. Int' I Minerals
& Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971)).
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permissible inference for the jury to draw in many cases. 247
People in management positions might well be expected to know
that handling of hazardous waste is regulated. 248 But there are
situations in which that presumption is questionable. 249 At a
minimum, it suggests that there is no clear break between
defendants whose conduct is within (A) as opposed to (B).
At this point, the Ninth Circuit was addressing whether the
statute, creating two categories of defendants, is unambiguous.
Congress may have wanted to distinguish along the line suggested
by the Ninth Circuit. But it is also possible that Congress's lack
of parallel syntax in (A) and (B) was the result of legislative
oversight.
Neither the Third nor Ninth Circuit looked to the other
provisions such as 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a), governing imposition of
civil penalties, which presents an interesting contrast to subsection
(d).
Specificially, under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(l), the
Administrator may file a civil action against an offender. 250
Initially, the appropriate relief is injunctive. Under 42 U.S.C. §
6928(a)(3), if the offender fails to take corrective action, the court
may impose a civil penalty. 251
In interpreting the criminal provision within the same section

247.
The problem with the Ninth Circuit's analysis is that it presumes
knowledge irrebuttably, rather than allowing a jury to make an inference. See
also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 {1979) (finding conclusive
preumption of intent unconstitutional).
248.
See Hof/in, 880 F.2d at 1037 (relying on United Stales v. Johnson
& Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664-65 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom.
Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 {1985)); see also United States v. Park,
421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1975) {holding that the "[g]overnment establishes a
prima facie case when it introduces evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by
the trier of facts that the defendant had, by reason of his position in the
corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance,
or prompting to correct the violation complained of, and that he failed to do
so."); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284-85 {1943).
See discussion infra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
249.
250.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1).
251.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3) (requiring violators who fail to take
corrective action within time specified by order referred to in (a)(l) and
(a)(2) to pay a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each day of
continued non-compliance).
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of RCRA, a court might compare the treatment of a defendant in
a civil proceeding and in a criminal proceeding. 252 Under 42
U.S.C. § 6928(a), before the court could impose a civil penalty,
the offender would have been put on notice of the violation in the
civil action for injunctive relief. Only upon noncompliance would
a civil penalty be imposed. 253 Hence, the offender would have
been given specific notice of his violation, presumably including
the fact that he was storing hazardous waste in violation of the
requirement that a permit be acquired. It is anomolous to believe
that a person may be a criminal offender, now a felon after the
1980 amendments, 254 on a lesser showing than would be required
to impose civil liability.
Ordinarily, in considering whether to impose strict liability,
legislatures and courts construing legislation consider the degree
of difficulty that a prosecutor may face in proving mens rea. 255
For example, a leading criminal law treatise states that legislatures
often create criminal liability without fault "to help the prosecution
cope with a situation wherein [a mens rea] is hard to prove,
making convictions difficult to obtain unless the fault element is
omitted. The legislature may think it important to stamp out the
harmful conduct in question at all costs, even at the cost of
convicting innocent-minded and blameless people. "256
Lowering the prosecutor's burden in a prosecution under 42

252.
See Kimes v. Bechtold, 342 S.E.2d 147, 150 (W. Va.1986) (quoting
syllabus point 3 of Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,
219 S.E. 2d 361 (W. Va. 1975) illustrating in pari materia rule of statutory
construction whereby statutes which relate to same subject matter should be
read and applied together so that legislature' s intention can be gathered from
the whole of enactments. But see Manchin v. Dunfee, 327 S.E.2d 710, 713-14
(W. Va. 1984) which limits in pari materia to ambiguous statutes only).
253.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(a).
See, e.g., United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 417 (5th Cir. 1991)
254.
(upholding defendant's sentence of sixteen concurrent 41 month sentences,
based on U .S.S.G. § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(B) and§ 2Q1.2(b)(4)).
255.
See, e.g., State v. Dobry, 250 N.W. 702, 705 (Iowa 1933);
Commonwealth v. Mixer, 93 N.E. 249, 249-50 (Mass. 1910); State v. Prince,
189 P.2d 993,995 (N.M. 1948); see also discussion in LAFAVE, supra note 106,
at 242-43.
256.
See LAFAVE, supra note 106, at 243.

1993]

DOES CULPABILITY MATTER?

229

U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) seems hardly necessary. The government
cannot seriously urge that the reading of "knowingly" as extending
to that subsection would impose an impossible or unreasonably
difficult burden on it. 257 It cannot seek the lesser sanction of
civil penalties until it has given notice to the offender that his
conduct violates a court order.
B.

What Did Congress Intend?

On the finding that the statutory language is ambiguous, a
court is to turn to the legislative history. 258 The legislative
history surrounding passage of RCRA' s criminal provisions is
sprase and unilluminating. 259 The House Report contains slightly
over a page of text discussing enforcement of RCRA' s
provisions, 260 and says little that bears on the mens rea question.
First, it observes that the Act provides for a wide array of
enforcement mechanisms "so that punishment is related to the
offense. "261 Second, it states that "[m]any times civil penalties
are more appropriate and more effective than criminal. "262 It

257.
See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990) (reaffirming the district court's jury
instruction which requires that defendant "knew" that the chemical wastes had
the potential to be harmful to others); see also United States V. Dee, 912 F.2d
741,743-44 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1990). But see id. at
1038 (quoting United States v. Int' I Mineral & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558,
565 (1971): "Where . .. dangerous or deleterious devices or products or
obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so
great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing
with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation.").
258.
See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985) (Supreme
Court interpretation of 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1), limited to the absence of
contrary purpose in the language or legislative history of the statute); United
States v. Agrillo-Ladlad, 675 F.2d 905, 908-09 (7th Cir. 1982); see also State
v. Hooper, 386 N.E.2d 1348, 1349 (Ohio 1979).
See United States v. Hayes lot' 1 Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502 (11th
259.
Cir. 1986).
260.
H.R. REP. No. 1491, 9411-1 CONG., 2ND SESS. 30, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.CA.N. 6238,6268-69.
261.
ld. at 6268.
Id.
262.
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does not specify when that might be the case. It does suggest that
the use of criminal sanctions is most appropriate "when there is a
willful violation of a statute which seriously harms human health
n263

After discussing the requirement that the Administrator give
notice of the nature of the violation and an opportunity to correct
the violation, the report returns to the use of criminal sanctions.
But the report largely tracks the statutory language, hardly
illuminating how the mens rea term should be read: "The use of
criminal penalties are sufficiently narrow in that they only apply
to those who knowingly transport hazardous waste to a facility
which does not have a permit, the actual disposal of hazardous
wastes without a permit, or the falsification of documents, an of
which are more serious offenses than the other provisions of the
hazardous waste title. "264
The House Report is hardly conclusive on the proper reading
of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A). But it does offer some support for
requiring that the mens rea attach to the permit requirement. It
emphasizes that the use of criminal sanctions would be appropriate
only in narrow circumstances. 265 Further, even though violations
of the Act were then characterized as misdemeanors, the report
underscores that Congress was concerned with principles of
proportionality, that the punishment should relate to the
In true public welfare statutes, the traditional
offense. 266
explanation has been that especially in light of the lesser penalties
that attach, the governmental interest in enforcement outweighs the
concern that someone otherwise blameless might be charged with
an offense. 267 The overriding need for deterrence and efficient
law enforcement compels abandoning notions of culpability and

263.
!d. (emphasis added).
264.
Id. at 6269.
265.
H .R. R EP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 30, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.CA.N. 6238, 6269.
266.
ld. at 6268.
267.
See State v. Collova, 255 N.W.2d 581, 585 (Wis. 1977) ("The usual
rationale for strict liability statutes is that the public interest is so great that
as to warrant the imposition of an absolute standard of care.").
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proportionality. 268 Here, Congress was not willing to abandon
the fault principle. Indeed, as with other modem enforcement
schemes, the government has a wide array of sanctions. 269 The
report demonstrates that enforcement goals did not have to be
sacrificied despite the limited use of criminal sanctions. Further,
the report demonstrates that even offenders subject to civil
penalties would have notice of their violations and an opportunity
to correct them. Thus, civil sanctions were not appropriate
without first giving the offender notice of the requirements of the
law. 270 Whatever might be said generally about the burden of
imposing a requirement that the government prove the defendant's
knowledge of the law, that would not appear to be a significant
obstacle in RCRA cases, at least where the government chose the
lesser sanction of civil penalties. 271
When Congress chose to increase the criminal sanctions and
to make violations of subsection (d) felonies, it again offerred little
guidance on the mens rea question. 272 But as with the 1976
report, some inferences might be made from the 1980 report.
The original thirty day notice period was eliminated "to
authorize the Administrator to act against violations before a
30-day period has elapsed. This provision is aimed at stopping
so-called 'midnight dumping' which may not continue at any
location for more than 30 days, and to seek penalties for single

268.
See Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 273,285-86 (1968) (summarizing BARBARA WOOTION, CRIME AND THE
CRIMINAL LAw (1966)); see also Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
COLUM. L. REV. 55, 73, 84 (1933) (supporting conviction for criminal
syndicalism or sedition cases in absence of intent by analogizing to public
welfare offenses). But see Solem v. Helm, 463 U .S. 277, 303 (1983)
(preserving notions of proportionality in criminal sentencing).
269.
H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th CONG., 2nd Sess. 30, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.CA.N. 6238,6269.
270.
!d. at 6268-69.
271.
But see United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038-39 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990).
272.
H .R. REP. No. 1444, 96th CONG., 2nd Sess. 39, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.CA.N. 5028, 5038.
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occurrences, rather than just continuing offenses. "273
The Joint Conference Report did contain an important
discussion about 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(B).274 The original act
did not contain that provision. Instead, it provided that:
Any person who knowingly -(1)
transports any hazardous waste listed under
this subtitle to a facility which does not have
a permit ...
(2)
disposes of any hazardous waste listed under
this subtitle without having obtained a
permit therefor . . .
shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine
of not more than $25,000 for each day of
violation, or to imprisonment not to exceed
one year, or both. 275
The 1980 amendments were intended, in part, to clarify the law.
As stated by the conference report, "[t]he proposed section as
amended would eliminate the ambiguity by providing explicit
penalties for knowingly failing to comply with a material condition
of the permit. "276
The legislative history on this point appears to conflict with
the Ninth Circuit's understanding of the difference between
subsections (A) and (B). The Ninth Circuit found that it was
rational to treat two classes of offenders differently, those who
notified the EPA of their activities and those who did not. 277
The legislative history does not suggest that Congress had that
273.
S.R. REP. No. 172, 96th CoNG., 2nd Sess. 4, repn'nted in 1980
U.S.C.CA.N. 5019,5022.
274.
H .R. REP. No. 1444, 96th CONG., 2nd Sess. 39, repn'nted in 1980
U.S.C.CA.N. 5028,5037.
275.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-580, § 3008, 90 Stat. 2812 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6928
(1992)).
276.
H.R. REP. No. 1444, 96th CONG., 2nd Sess. 36-37, repn'nted in
1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 5028,5036.
277.
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
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distinction in mind. Instead, it intended to clarify an area of
uncertainty by making explicit that those who obtain a permit may
in fact be prosecuted.278
The only other relevant discussion of mens rea is that of the
Eleventh Circuit in Hayes International: "Congress did not
provide any guidance . . . concerning the meaning of 'knowing'
in Section 6928(d). !need, Congress stated that it had not sought
to define 'knowing' for offenses under subsection (d); that process
has been left to the courts under general principles. "279 By
contrast, because Congress was enacting a new crime in subsection
(e), knowing endangerment, it did specifically define knowledge
for purposes of that subsection. 280 It did so by borrowing the
definition of knowledge from the proposed Criminal Code Reform
Act, S. 1722,281 a definition which largely tracks the Model
Penal Code definition of knowledge. 282
It is unclear in context whether the conferees meant to
address the issue before the courts in Johnson & Towers and
Hojlin, that is, how far down the sentence the mens rea term
should run. The meaning of knowledge is hardly settled, despite
its clearly stated meaning in the Model Penal Code.283 The
reference in the conference report suggests that under subsection
(e), the courts should require actual subjective awareness of a risk

278.
H.R. REP. No. 1444, 96th CONG., 2nd Sess. 36-37, reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 5028, 5036.
279.
United States v. Hayes Int '1 Corp., 786 F. 2d 1499, 1502 (11th Cir.
1986) (quoting S. Rep. No. 173, 96th CONG., 2ND SESS. 39, reprinted in 1980
U .S.C.CA.N. 5028, 5038).
280.
Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-482, 94 Stat. 23341 § 13(f) (codified as amended at 42 U .S.C. § 6928
(1992)).
S. 1722, 96th CONG., 1st Sess. § 302 (1979) (never enacted) ("A
281.
person •s state of mind is knowing with respect to (1) his conduct if he is
aware of the nature of his conduct; (2) an existing circumstance if he is aware
or believes that the circumstances exist; (3) a result of his conduct if he is
aware or believes that his conduct is substantially certain to cause the result.").
282.
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02(2)(B) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
283.
MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.02(2)(B) (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
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in defining "knowledge. "284 Hence, by implication, all it meant
by its statement that the definition of "knowing" would be left to
the courts under general principles was that courts would have to
decide whether knowledge could be established based on a
reasonable person standard. 285
Neither in 1976 nor in 1980 did Congress clearly grasp the
issue that has divided the circuit courts. At best, it offers some
general guidance. It recognized the principle of proportionality
and culpability, usually not relevant if the statute creates a public
welfare offense. 286 Hence, in construing the Act, the court ought
to inquire whether the underlying conduct (without knowledge of
the permit requirement) would be blameworthy. Further, given
the wide array of enforcement devices, Congress recognized that
enforcement would not turn only on the availability of criminal
sanctions, reducing the risk that liberally construing the knowledge
requirement would impair effective enforcement goals and public
safety. Beyond that, the congressional history provides no
smoking gun.

C.

Background Assumptions of the Criminal Law

If statutory language and legislative history are inconclusive,
the Supreme Court has looked to "background assumption[s] of our
criminal law" 287 to interpret the relevant statutory provision. To

284.
H.R. REP. No. 1444, 96th CONG., 2nd Sess. 39, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.CA.N. 5028, 5038.
285.
See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662,664-65
(3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States 469 U.S. 1208
(1985) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) subjects employees to criminal
prosecution only if they knew or should have known that there had been no
compliance with the permit requirement of§ 6925); see also 126 CONG. REc.
H3368 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1980).
286.
See Kadish, supra note 268, at 285-86 (summarizing BARBARA
WOOTION, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1966)); see also Sayre, supra
note 268, at 55, 73, 84 (supporting conviction for criminal syndicalism or
sedition cases in absence of intent by analogizing to public welfare offenses).
But see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (preserving notions of
proportionality in criminal sentencing).
287.
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985).
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do so seems rational based on the assumption that Congress would
legislate in light of general principles governing the criminal
law.2ss
Identifying the background assumptions of the criminal law,
however, may be no mean feat. While the Supreme Court would
appear to rely on traditional principles of the criminal law,
examination of three leading cases demonstrates that over time, the
Supreme Court has found somewhat different background
assumptions to guide their interpretation of ambiguous language.

1.

Morissette v. United States
Morissette289 involved a statute, like 42 U .S.C. § 6928, in

which Congress used the term "knowingly" without clearly
defining the elements to which it attached. 18 U .S.C. § 641
provides that "[w]hoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly
convens to his use or the use of another . . . any . . . thing of
value of the United States ... [s]hall be fined ... or imprisoned
... or both. "290
Morissette entered a large tract of the government's land
where he hoped to hunt for deer. Unsuccessful in his efforts to
kill a deer, he hoped to recoup the expenses of his trip by
salvaging a large quantity of rusting, spent bomb cases, apparently
discarded by the Air Force. 291 Morissette freely admitted his
conduct and told an investigator that "he had no intention of
stealing but thought the property was abandoned, unwanted and
considered of no value to the Government. "292 The trial court
refused to allow Morissette to defend on the ground that he
288.
See id. at 426 (Brennan, J., noting that the failure of Congress to
unambiguously indicate intent does not signal a departure from basic
assumptions of criminal law, thus inferring that Congress • intent or
understanding is that basic rules of criminal law are to be followed); see also
United States v. Agrillo-Ladlad, 675 F.2d 905, 909-10 (7th Cir. 1982); State v.
Hooper, 386 N.E.2d 1348, 1349-50 (Ohio 1979); LAFAVE, supra note 106, at
75 (use of canons of construction).
289.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 248 (1952).
290.
18 u.s.c. § 641.
291.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 247.
292.
!d. at 248.
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thought that the property was abandoned and, instead, instructed
the jury that "[t]he question on intent is whether or not he intended
to take the property. "293
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court framed the issue as
the court of appeals had and treated the case as one in which
Congress had omitted "any mention of criminal intent. "294 The
court of appeals had relied on two earlier Supreme Court decisions
in which Congress was silent on mens rea, in which cases the
Supreme Court had found an intent to make the offenses strict
liability offenses. 295
In light of the explicit reference to the term "knowingly" in
18 U.S.C. § 641, the characterization of the statute as silent on
mens rea seems odd. More importantly, the Court was not merely
content to define the necessary elements of 18 U.S.C. § 641 and
to ask whether "knowingly convert" demonstrated an intent to
distinguish an innocent converter, liable in tort, 296 from a
culpable offender, chargeable with a criminal offense. 297 Had
the Court done so, it would have reached the same result as it did,
that Morissette was entitled to defend on the basis of his belief that
the property was abandoned. But the decision would have been of
minor importance.
Instead, Justice Jackson offered a comprehensive discussion
of common law crimes and public welfare statutes and the different
presumptions that attach when a court is called upon to determine
the mens rea in a given offense. 298 Given the Court's conclusion
that Morissette's offense was not a public welfare statute, the
Court's discussion on point is dicta, albeit influential. The
distinction between mala in se and mala prohibitum has been
recognized as a basis of determining legislative intent, absent

293.
/d. at 249.
294.
/d. at 250.
295.
/d. at 249-50 (referring to United States v. Behrman, 258 U .S. 280
(1922) and United States v. Balint, 258 U .S. 250 (1922)) .
296.
See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 270; see also Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 222A(l) (1976).
297.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 270.
298.
/d. at 270-73.
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unambiguous language or clear intent. 299
Morissette's discussion of the mens rea requirement for
common law crimes is consistent with the Court 1 s discussion of the
background assumptions of the criminal law today. Justice
Jackson asserted that "[t]he contention that an injury can amount
to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or
transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems
of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good
and evil. "300
More troubling was Justice Jackson 1 s discussion of public
welfare offenses. He defined broadly instances in which Congress
would be presumed to have intended no mens rea, despite severe
penalties that might attach to the conduct. 301 He suggested that
to impose liability in such cases, while criticized by "responsible
and disinterested students of penology" 302 was exclusively the
province of Congress. 303 For example, he accepted acritically
that most often mala prohibitum offenses provide for "relatively
small" penalties and do "no grave damage to an offender's
reputation. "304 Despite recognizing that some commentators had
expressed misgivings305 about the line between public welfare
and traditional common law offenses, Justice Jackson suggested no
limits on Congress 1 s power to draw the line or the Court's

299.
See LAFAVE, supra note 106, at 79. ("Other things being equal,
• statutes ' involving morally bad conduct should be construed more strictly
t~an those involving conduct not so bad.").
300.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250; see also MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
301.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 258-59.
302.
Id. at 254 n.14.
303.
Id. at 258 (quoting United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52
(1922)); see also Morissette, 342 U .S. at 256.
304.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256; see also United States v. Balint, 258
U.S. 250, 251 (1922) (subjecting defendant to possible five year sentence under
Narcotics Act of December 17, 1914, c. 1, 38 Stat. 785).
305.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256.
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willingness to follow that line. 306
Morissette established a presumption of congressional intent.
But it imposed a presumption in favor of a mens rea requirement
when the offense was a common law offense. The Court stated that
"where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated
the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were
attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from
which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the
judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. "307 Under Morissette's
approach, if a defendant could not demonstrate that the offense had
common law origins, then a statute silent on a requisite mens rea
where no clear congressional intent could otherwise be established,
would be read literally to allow imposition of liability without any
showing of blameworthiness. 308 Otherwise innocent conduct
could lead to a felony conviction and a term of imprisonment,
apart from Morissette's reassurance that penalties associated with
mala prohibitum offenses are usually relatively small. 309

2.

United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp.

In International Minerals, 310 the corporate defendant was
charged with shipping sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acid without a

306.
Id. at 275 (Jackson, J ., writing for the majority, failed to set any
limitations on the Court's holding). See also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
303 (1983) (reversing a life imprisonment sentence for violation of a seventh
non-violent felony due to limitations based upon notions of proportionality and
cruel & unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment); see also State v.
Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344, 349 (Minn. 1986) (holding that a statute which
imposes vicarious criminal liability on an employer whose employee serves
intoxicating liquor to a minor violates due process).
307.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
308.
United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39, 43-44 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
309.
Id. Compare with United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277,285
(1943).
310.
United States v. Int' I Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U. S. 558
(1971).
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proper label that the liquids were corrosive. 311 That was a
violation of an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulation
promulgated under 18 U.S.C. § 834(a) 312 and made a criminal
offense under 18 U .S.C. § 834(t) which provided that whoever
"knowingly violates any such regulation" 313 shall be fined or
imprisoned.
The issue before the Court was whether "'knowledge' of the
regulation is . . . required. "314 Initially, the Court rejected the
idea that without imposing a requirement of knowledge of the
regulation the offense imposed strict liability. After all, argued
Justice Douglas, "knowledge of the shipment of the dangerous
materials is required. "315 An accused could defend on the basis
that he thought that the liquid shipped was harmless. 316
International Minerals did not explicitly address whether the
Act was ambiguous. But it did address both the legislative history
and what might be characterized as the relevant background
assumption of the criminal law. In 1960, Congress considered
amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 834 and, according to the majority,
it demonstrated that Congress did not intend to abandon the
general rule that ignorance of the law is no defense. 317 In fact,
despite what would appear to be a plausible reading of the
Act, 318 the Court relied heavily on "the general rule that
ignorance of the law is no excuse . ... "319
The Court acknowledged Morissette's insistence that mens

311.
Id. at 559.
312.
18 U.S.C. § 834(a) (1971) (repealed (1979)).
313.
18 U.S.C. § 834(f) (1971) (repealed (1979)).
314.
Int '/Minerals, 402 U.S. at 560.
315.
Id. at 565 (referring to United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601
(1961), which held that notice attatches to the object); see also btt 'I Minerals,
402 U.S. at 565.
316.
Id. at 563-64 ("A person thinking in good faith that he was
shipping distilled water when in fact he was shipping some dangerous acid
would not be covered.").
317.
Id. at 563.
318.
After all, the explicit language of the Act suggests that one must
know of the regulation. See discussion supra notes 219-21 and accompanying
text.
319.
Int ' / Minerals, 402 U.S. at 562.
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rea matters. 320 But the Court focused on what has since often
been accepted acritically as a presumption of knowledge. It
suggested that in some cases, due process concerns might require
knowledge of regulations: "Pencils, dental floss, paper clips may
. . . be regulated. But they may be the type of products which
might raise substantial due process questions if Congress did not
require . . . 'mens rea' as to each ingredient of the offense. "321
But the Court distinguished objects that carry with them notice of
regulation: "[W]here, as here and as in Balint and Freed,
dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste
materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that
anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing
with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation. "322
It is not always recognized that relying on the presumption of
knowledge, International Minerals appears to be addressing the
constitutional minimum, not a rule of construction . Although not
without ambiguity, the opinion seems to hold the following: the
statutory language is ambiguous; the legislative history provides
some support that the knowledge term does not attach to the ICC
regulations; when in doubt, the Court should look to background
assumptions of the criminal law to divine what Congress might
have meant and here, the relevant background assumption is that
ignorance of the law is no excuse. 323 Further, but in response
to a different argument, the Court seemed to hold that due process
may impose some mens rea requirement324 -- for example, in
cases involving the possession of otherwise innocent objects. But
when the object itself is dangerous, due process does not require
that mens rea attach to the regulation. In that context, the quoted

320.
Id. at 564 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250
(1952)).
321.
Int'l Minerals, 402 U .S. at 564-65.
322.
/d.
323.
See, e.g. People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1069 (N.Y. 1987);
Gardner v. People, 62 N.Y. 299 (1875). But see MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.04
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) (allowing mistake of law defense under
exceptional circumstances).
324.
Int 'I Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564-65; see, e.g., Lambert v. California,
355 u.s. 225, 227 (1957).
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passage concerning the probability of regulation and the hazardous
nature of the offending object is not a rule of construction for
statutes like the one involved in International Minerals, but part of
the holding that Congress had discretion to dispense with mens rea
with respect to the "regulation" element of the offense. 325
The distinction is significant. The presumption that one must
know of the regulations from the nature of the object does not
become relevant unless there is a due process challenge. It is not
a presumption that bears on legislative intent. Rephrased, it is a
question of constitutional power, rather than congressional
preference. That becomes important when I argue that Justice
Douglas grossly overstated the importance of the maxim that
"ignorance of the law is no excuse," and that reliance on other
more important background assumptions of the criminal law might
have produced a different result in International Minerals .326

3.

Liparota v. United States

As did Morisseue and International Minerals, Liparotal21
involved a statute in which Congress used the term "knowingly,"
but left for judicial interpretation the decision about whether
"knowingly" attached to all of the statutory elements of the
offense. 328 As in International Minerals, the statute required the
government to show that the defendant's conduct violated
regulations promulgated under an administrative scheme. 329
Frank Liparota, the co-owner of Moon's Sandwich Shop,
purchased food stamps for substantially less than their face value.
On one occasion, Liparota paid a Department of Agriculture
undercover agent $150 for $195 worth of food stamps. Later, he
bought $500 worth of food stamps for $350, and then $500 worth

325.
By contrast, a statute violates due process if it criminalizes a
person for failing to act when her omissions are otherwise innocent. See
Lambert, 355 U .S. at 229-30.
326.
See discussion infra notes 359-393 and accompanying text.
327.
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
Id. at 424-25.
328.
329.
Id. at 419.
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of food stamps for $300. 330 The transaction took place under
circumstances that demonstrated Liparota Is guilty knowledge. 331
Liparota was charged with violating 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(l),
which provides in relevant part: "[W]hoever knowingly uses,
transfers, acquires, alters or possesses coupons ... in any manner
not authorized by this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to
this chapter shall . . . be guilty of a felony . . . . "332 The
district court rejected Liparota 1 s proposed jury instruction to the
effect that the government must prove that "the defendant
knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposely intending
to violate the law. "333 The gist of the district court's instruction
on point was that defendant in fact had to have acquired the food
stamps in a manner that violated the law; but the only knowledge
to be proven was that "the Defendant knowingly and wilfully
acquired the food stamps. "334
Justice Brennan noted that different mens rea requirements
might attach to different elements of an offense and that other
mens rea classifications exist besides specific and general
intent. 335 Given the statutory language in an offense like § 2024
and the failure of Congress to enact legislation similar to the
Model Penal Code, 336 those possibilities really do not present
themselves to the litigants. That is, the government was not free
to argue that, for example, while knowledge attaches to the
acquisition element of the offense, the government must only prove
that Liparota should have known that his conduct violated the
law. 337 If the Court were to so hold, it would be an obvious

330.
Id. at 421-22.
331.
Id. at 434 n.17.
332.
7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1985) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 2024).
333.
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 422 (1985) (quoting On
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, Joint Appendix at 34, Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985)
(No. 84-5108) [hereinafter Writ]).
334.
Liparota, 471 U.S. at 422 (quoting Writ, supra note 333, at 33).
335.
Id. at 423-24 n.5.
336.
S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1979) (never enacted).
337.
See generally United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d
662, 664-65 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469
U.S. 1208 (1985); see also Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element
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usurpation of Congress' authority to define the elements of an
offense. 338
As discussed above, it is late in the day to argue that this
statute is unambiguous. 339 Justice Brennan found that either
interpretation, that knowledge attached to "authorized by" the law
as urged by Liparota or that it attached only to "acquires" as
argued by the government, "would accord with ordinary
usage. "340 In addition, Liparota found the legislative history
silent on the question of the proper interpretation of the Act. 341
At that point, the Court had to turn to background
assumptions of the criminal law. The core assumption that the
Court relied on was that, absent a contrary purpose, mens rea
should attach to all of the statutory elements. 342 Liparota found
that assumption to be the teaching of Morissette. 343 The Court
found a strong presumption in favor of implying a mens rea term.
That was particularly the case when a contrary reading of the Act
might "criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent
conduct. "344 It disguished cases like United States v. Yermain,
where the Court limited the mens rea term to the falsity of the
defendant's statement and refused to attach knowledge to the fact
that the defendant was dealing with a federal agency. 345 In
Yermain, on the Court's reading of the applicable statute, the

Analysis in Defilling Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35
STAN L. REV. 681 (seeking to emphasize the importance of the Model Penal
Code's element analysis).
338.
See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 423-24 (MOur task is to determine which
meaning Congress intended. "The definition of the elements of a criminal
offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal
crimes, which are solely creatures of statute."); see also Liparota, 471 U.S. at
424 n.6 (stating that Congress must act within constitutional restraints).
See discussion supra notes 200-33 and accompanying text.
339.
340.
Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424.
341.
Id. at 423-24.
342.
!d. at 425.
343.
!d. at 425-26.
344.
!d. at 426; see also id. at 427 (supporting traditonal principles of
lenity). But see id. at 428 (government's position regarding subsection (E)).
345.
Liparota, 471 U.S. at 432.
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government had to demonstrate that an offender was
blameworthy. 346
The Court addressed two arguments that have importance for
an analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 6928. In a footnote, the Court
responded to the dissent's argument that it was creating a "mistake
of law" defense. 347 Justice Brennan argued, in effect, that he
was merely interpreting the statutory language consistent with
traditional interpretative principles. 348 By contrast, the traditional
maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse refers only to the
situation in which an accused tries to deny knowledge of the very
penal law with which he is charged. 349 Hence, Brennan
distinguished between an accused charged with receiving stolen
goods who cannot claim that he did not know that receipt of stolen
goods is illegal, but can defend on the ground that he did not know
that the good were stolen. 350 . That the goods were or were not
stolen might tum on what technically is a question of law, such as
who is the lawful owner of the property in question. 351
The government also contended that the statute in question
created a public welfare offense, that would, therefore, "'consist
only of forbidden acts or omissions.' "352 Had the Court analyzed
7 U.S.C. § 2024 in light of factors identified in Morissette, it
might have concluded that dealing in paper issued pursuant to a
federal entitlements program was not a crime at common law. 353

346.
United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 69 (1984).
347.
Liparota, 411 U.S. at 425 n.9.
348.
/d. at 422 (Brennan, J., referring to MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02
commentary at 131 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955)).
349.
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02(9) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
350.
Liparota, 411 U.S. at 425 n.9. See also Regina v. Smith (David),
(1974) 1 All E. R. 632 (defendant was able to defend against a charge of
recklessly damaging the property of another by introducing evidence of a good
faith belief that the property destroyed was his own).
See Regina, 1 All E . R. 632, 636; see also MODEL PENAL CODE
351.
§ 2.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL
lAW: THE GENERAL PART§ 100, at 287 (2d ed. 1961).
352.
Liparota, 411 U.S. at 432 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342
u.s. 246, 252-53 (1952)).
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 259-61.
353.
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The question surely would have been a close one. 354 The
Court's response certainly suggests a narrowing of the Court's
public welfare offenses analysis. Its response to the assertion that
7 U.S.C. § 2024 created a public welfare offense was brief: "the
offense at issue here differs substantially from those 'public
welfare offenses' we have previously recognized. "355 It limited
its public welfare analysis by observing that "Congress has
rendered criminal a type of conduct that a reasonable person
should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may
seriously threaten the community's health or safety .... "356
Liparota's discussion of public welfare offenses is consistent
with the disillusionment with strict liability offenses.357 It
imposes a limitation on the category of cases where the Court will
find public welfare offenses in absence of clear congressional
intent to the contrary. While that result is to be applauded, its
response to the government's argument can work mischief, as it
did in United States v. Hojlin. 358 In context, the Court seems to
have created a presumption that when Congress does regulate
subjects that effect "the community's health or safety, "359 it
intends to impose strict liability on the offender on the irrebuttable
presumption that a person is negligent for failing to know of the
regulations. The Court's citation to International Minerals is
As discussed above, International Minerals
misplaced. 360
created no such presumption. 361 There, the Court relied on the
notice inherent in the possession of dangerous objects in discussing
whether due process is violated if no mens rea attaches to an
element of an offense. By contrast, International Minerals
suggested that if the defendant is in violation of a regulation of an

354.
See also United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39, 45 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
355.
Liparota, 471 U.S. at 432-33.
356.
Id. at 433.
357.
ld. at 431-33.
358.
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
359.
Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433.
360.
Id.
361.
See discussion supra notes 321-323 and accompanying text.
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otherwise innocent activity due process may be violated "if
Congress did not require . .. 'mens rea' as to each ingredient of
the offense. "362
Liparota creates a strong presumption against criminalizing
conduct that might otherwise be innocent and in favor of reading
liberally any mens rea requirement found within a federal statute.
But it careless!y suggested a separate category of cases when
Congress is regulating otherwise harmful activity. There, without
deciding the question , Liparota suggests a different presumption
concerning congressional intent when a statute regulates dangerous
activity. International Minerals, the Court's support for that view,
hardly justifies its conclusion.
V.

SORTING Our BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW

Absent plain meaning and clear legislative intent to the
contrary, International Minerals was unwilling to assume that
Congress intended to make knowledge of a particular regulation an
element of the offense. It did so in large part because "it is too
much to conclude that . . . the House [intended to] carv[e] out an
exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no
excuse. "363 Justice Douglas should have known better.
It was after all Justice Douglas who wrote the Court's
opinion in Lambert v. California, 364 in which the Supreme Court
struck down a local ordinance that imposed a registration
requirement on any convicted person who remained in Los Angeles
for more than five days.365 The Court found that the ordinance
violated the due process notice requirement in that it applied to a
person "who has no actual knowledge of his duty to register. "366
The Court did suggest that nothing in Lambert's circumstances

362.
United States v. Int ' 1 Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558,
564-65 (1971) .
363. Id. at 563.
364.
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
365. !d. at 228-29.
366.
!d. at 227.
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would lead her "to inquire as to the necessity of registration. "367
Despite some ominous language in Justice Frankfurter's
dissent, 368 Lamben did not usher in a general defense of
ignorance of the law. 369 But it stands as one of a number of
areas where ignorance of the law is excusable, where an offender's
fault for not knowing is so lacking that it is unfair to punish the
offender. 370
More to the point, however, commentators371 and some
courts372 have long recognized that the claim that ignorance of
the law is no excuse is overstated.
The generalization that
ignorance of the law is no excuse remains largely true in two
classes of cases. First, those cases in which a defendant contends
that he was ignorant of the law with which he has been
charged; 373 and, second, those cases in which the offender is
aware of the law, concludes reasonably and in good faith that it
does not apply to him, but guesses wrong. 374 On occasion, most

367.
ld. at 229.
368.
ld. at 230 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
369.
See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 232 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). See also Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 537 (1982); see also
United States v. Freed, 410 U.S. 601, 608 (1971); MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02(9) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
370.
See Coxv. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559,566-67 (1965); see also MODEL
PENAL CODE§ 2.04 commentary at 274-75 (1985).
371.
MODEL P ENAL CODE, § 2.04 commentary at 274-75 (1985);
Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 671, 689-95 (1976); George P. Fletcher, The Individualization
of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269, 1295-99 (1974); Henry W.
Seney, ""When Empty Te"ors Overawe"--Our Criminal Law Defenses (Part Two),
19 WAYNE L. REV. 1359, 1364-76 (1973).
See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 420 (1985);
372.
Lambert, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); United States v. Simpson, 561 F. 2d 53, 61-62
(7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 827-28 (9th
Cir. 1976).
373.
See, e.g., Morgan v. Dist. of Columbia, 476 A.2d 1128, 1133 (D.C.
App. 1984); United States v. Currier, 621 F.2d 7, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1980); State v.
Clark, 346 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1984); State v. Weitzman, 427 A.2d 3, 6-7 (N.H.
1981).
374.
See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART
§ 101, at 288-89 (2d ed. 1961).
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importantly in regulatory offenses, courts face situations in which
the offender seems entirely blameless. Nonetheless, largely based
on a utilitarian rationale, courts follow Justice Holmes' argument
that "justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger
intereStS On the Other Side Of the SCaleS [the general good). "375
Courts and legislatures have created narrow exceptions to the
rule where a defendant has gone beyond merely reading the statute
and misconstruing its language. 376 For example, the Model
Penal Code recognizes five situations in which a defendant has an
affirmative defense of proving a reasonable mistake of law:m
it recognizes a claim of inadequate publication of the law; 378 it
also recognizes four situations in which the defendant has relied on
a later determined invalid or erroneous interpretation of the
law. 379 Again largely for utilitarian policy concerns, the Model
Penal Code, like the common law, does not allow a claim that the
defendant relied on advice of counsel. 380
The categories hardly seem principled. The categories do
identify blameless, reasonable actors who are excused because of
their mistake concerning the law. But the line falls far short of
providing a defense to all blameless actors whose mistake is one

375.
See People v. Marrero, 507 N.E. 2d 1068, 1069 (N.Y. 1987)
(quoting OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1881); see also supra
note 374 at 288-89. But see Immanuel Kant, 17te Philosophy Of Law, in THE
GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 237, 257 (Clarence Morris ed. 1971) ("(o]ne
man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the
purpose of another ...").
See also Ma"ero, 507 N.E.2d at 1069-70 (precluding mistake of
376.
law exception despite language of N.Y. Penal Law§ 15.20).
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.04(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
377.
378.
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.04(3)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
!d. § 2.04(3)(b). See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 568-71
379.
(1%5) (allowing an exception to mistake of law rule where defendant
reasonably relies on public officer's enforcement of the law); United States
v. Albertini, 830 F.2d 985, 989-90 (9th Cir. 1987) (allowing an exception to
mistake of law rule where defendant reasonably relies on judicial opinion);
Long v. State, 165 A.2d 489 (1949) (allowing an exception to mistake of law
where defendant reasonably relies on legality of divorce proceedings); State
v. Godwin, 31 S.E. 221 (N.C. 1898) (reasonably relying on a statute later
found unconstitutional).
MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.04 commentary at 279-280 (1985).
380.
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of law. 381 Lamben demonstrates the kind of ad hoc line that
exists in the field. There, a convicted felon, picked up on
suspicion of another offense, was charged under a Los Angeles
ordinance that required a convicted felon to register with the police
if she remained in Los Angeles for a more than five days.382 The
Court held that Lambert's conviction violated the notice provision
of the due process clause. 383
Lamben might have been grounded on the absence of the
offender's blameworthiness in failing to know the law. Obviously,
Lambert's failure to know the unusual provision of law could be
distinguished from an offender who claimed ignorance of the law
of theft or murder. 384 A line based on blameworthiness would
have been principled. Had the Court gone that route, any number
of defendants would be able to argue that the unusual nature of a
particular regulatory crime made their lack of knowledge
defensible. 385 But the Court stopped far short of such a holding.
Instead, it narrowed Lamben to situations dealing with crimes
involving "conduct that is wholly passive -- mere failure to
register. "386
Not all omissions were within the Court's
387
holding.
More importantly, Justice Douglas suggested that a
person whose crime involves an act will be put on notice of the
possibilty that the conduct is unlawful. 388
381.
See, e.g., People v. 0' Brien 31 P. 45, 46-47 (Cal. 1892); Oakland
v. Carpentier, 21 Cal. 642 (1863); Rex v. Esop, 173 Eng. Rep. 203 (1836); Rex
v. Bailey, 168 Eng. Rep. 651 (1800).
382.
Lambert v. California, 355 U .S. 225, 226 (1957).
383.
Lambert, 355 U.S. at 227. It is worth noting that defendant was
denied an opportunity to defend on lack of knowledge, id. at 227.
384.
Cf. Rex v. Esop, 173 Eng. Rep. 203 (1936) (not allowing an
ignorance of the law defense where the act of sodomy was not criminal in the
defendant's native country).
385.
Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 433-36 (1958) (criticizing the Lambert decision).
386.
Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228.
Id. at 229 (Douglass, J ., distinguishing the statute in question from
387.
statutes requiring the licensing of businesses); see also United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U .S. 277, 285 (1943) (involving interstate transport of
misbranded drugs); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250,251 (1922) (involving
sale of drugs).
388.
Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228.
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Lamben's distinctions have been widely criticized. 389 At
a minimum, Lamben demonstrates the ambivalence of courts in
defining the law governing ignorance of the law. It has hardly had
a settled course.
Cases like Liparota, International Minerals, and the cases
interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 6928 represent a distinct line of mistake
of law cases. Unlike the defendant who claims ignorance of the
law with which he is charged or ignorance about its interpretation,
the defendant in Liparota argued that knowledge of the law was a
material element of offense and that his ignorance of the law
negated a material element of the offense. 390
The common law distinguished between specific and general
intent offenses, whereby ignorance of the law was relevant only if
the defendant was charged with a specific intent offense.391 The
most obvious examples, of course, were cases involving good faith
mistakes concerning ownership of property in theft and related
offenses. 392
More recent proposals have abandoned the
distinction as unfounded. 393 As described by the Model Penal
Code, this class of cases involves a situation in which "[t]he
culpability issue is essentially the same for a given offense
whatever the abstract classification of the error that is asserted.
u394

389.
See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKJNG CRIMINAL LAw 424-25
(1978); see also Henry M. Hart, 11te Aims of the Criminal Law, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 433-36 (1958).
390.
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 423 (1985). Compare with
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
391.
See Williams, supra note 374, at 294.
392.
See, e.g., State v. Ebbeler, 223 S.W. 396 (Mo. 1920); Regina v.
Smith (David), (1974) 1 All E. R. 632.
393.
MODEL PENAL CODE§§ 2.02, 2.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(setting out mens rea requirement and allowing a defense when requisite mens
rea not proven). But see State v. Woods, 179 A. 1, 2-3 (Vt. 1935) (holding
that a "guilty mind" by defendant not required for conviction).
394.
MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.04 commentary at 270 n.2 (1985). The
Model Penal Code's approach should hardly be surprising to a student of the
criminal law. It reflects the predominant view that culpability is a necessary
condition for punishment. As I have developed elsewhere, commentators of
every political persuasion have urged that retribution is the primary
justification for punishment.
See Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering
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What emerges in legal commentaries, case law, and
codifications like the Model Penal Code, is a general rule that
where a mens rea term is provided or implied395 it attaches to all
material elements of an offense. 396 Further, if the material
element of the offense involves a question of law, like lawful
authority, the mens rea term applies equally to that material
element. Liparota reflects the same understanding of statutory
construction. With regard to 42 U.S.C. § 6928, there would
appear to be no coherent reason to abandon that traditional
understanding. In other words, insofar as the Third Circuit would
run the knowledge term all the way to attach to the permit
requirement, 397 Johnson & Towers is entirely consistent with the
law governing mens rea and mistake of law.

Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1012 (1991). The Supreme Court has
suggested that sentencing a nonculpable offender to a term of imprisonment
may be a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
290-94 (1983).
Liparota v. United States is largely consistent with that theme. Justice
Brennan argued that culpability is the predominant background assumption
of the criminal law. Liparota, 471 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1985). When a court
must analyze whether a mens rea term attaches to a material element, the
maxim concerning ignorance of the law is simply inapplicable. Once that
point is recognized, the Court should have simply concluded that United States
v. Int'l Minerals & Cltem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1943), was wrongly decided.
As it stands, Liparota 's analysis, consistent with Model Penal Code §§ 2.02(4)
and 2.04(1), and Liparota 's weak attempt to distinguish Int 'I Minerals are
irreconcilable and can only produce confusion.
395.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (Proposed Official Draft
1%2); see also Regina v. Smith (David), (1974) 1 All E. R. 632.
3%.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962);
see also ld. § 2.04(1) (treating mistake of fact and mistake of law in the same
way).
397.
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664-65 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
But see id. at 664-65 (holding that "knew or should have known" is the
standard).
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VI. PUBLIC POLICY AND IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
As indicated above, one traditional and strong justification for
the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse is the
utilitarian argument that "justice to the individual is rightly
outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the
scales. "398 The same kind of utilitarian justification underlies the
strict liability requirement in mala prohibitum offenses. 399
Indeed, the court in Hojlin relied on the fact that, despite the
presence of a mens rea term, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 was a public
welfare offense, justifying a narrow construction of the mens rea
term. 400 This section discusses whether the competing interests
identified by Justice Holmes, justice to the individual and
important public interests, can be accommodated without
criminalizing an otherwise blameless individual.
Courts have traditionally justified punishment of an offender
without allowing an ignorance of the law defense or without a
mens rea element at all largely on similar grounds. As explained
by one state court, "[t]he usual rationale for strict liability statutes
is that the public interest is so great as to warrant the imposition
of an absolute standard of care . . . . "401 That is especially true
in cases, like traffic offenses, where the prosecutor may need to
try a large number of offenders without the added and difficult
burden of establishing a knowledge or mens rea element. 402 In
partial response to the criticism that the result is unjust, some
courts have argued that mala prohibitum offenses carry minor
penalties; in effect, they are civil cases. 403 That ignores both the
stigma attaching to the criminal charges and the real possibility of
imprisonment in some instances. A further argument to support
strict liability offenses and to justify disallowing the ignorance of

398.
See Holmes, supra note 375, at 48.
399.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 259-61 (1952).
400.
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F. 2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
401.
State v. Collova, 255 N.W. 2d 581, 585 (Wis. 1977).
402.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 44 N.E. 503, 504 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes,
J., writing for the majority).
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U .S. 246, 256 (1952).
403.
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the law defense is that we can trust prosecutors not to proceed and
juries not to convict blameless offenders. 404 With regard to
disallowing an ignorance of the law defense, the additional
argument has been made that people are aware of the law.405
Each of these arguments has been criticized in an ample
literature attacking strict liability and the general absence of an
ignorance of the law defense. 406 But whatever efficacy the
arguments may have, for example, within the context of regulating
traffic offenses, 407 the arguments appear singularly unpersuasive
within the context of federal regulatory schemes.
Congress commonly establishes regulatory schemes with a
wide array of enforcement remedies. The pattern varies, but the
agency may initially be empowered to negotiate with the regulated
entity; 408 thereafter, it may be able to seek injunctive relief, 409
attach assets, 410 seek civil or criminal penalties and fines. 411
In some instances, especially in cases involving egregious
behavior, the agency may be able to seek or have the Justice
Department seek a criminal indictment. 41 2
The Internal Revenue Code provides an example of the
government's power to use a variety of enforcement tools. As
with many federal regulatory schemes, 413 the tax code is
404.
See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943); see
also Long v. State, 65 A.2d 489 (Del. 1989).
405.
See, e.g., Weeks v. State, 132 So. 870, 871 (Ala. 1931); Satterfield
v. State, 109 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Neb. 1961).
See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.04 commentary at 274-75 (1985); see
406.
also Cass, supra note 371, at 689-99; Fletcher, supra, note 371, at 1295-99;
Seney, supra note 371, at 1364-76.
407.
Sayre, supra note 268, at 87 n.6.
408.
21 U .S.C. § 462 (1972). See also Henry H . Perritt, Jr., Negotiated
Rulemaking and Administrative Law, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 471, 471 (1986).
409.
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2805(b)(2) (1992).
410.
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U .S.C. § 6332(d).
See Jackson v. Concord Cas., 253 A.2d 793, 800 (N.J. 1969); see
411.
also United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517-18 (1911).
412.
Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (1992)
413.
For example, the EPA administers 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1987),
which provides civil and criminal penalties for polluting waters where the goals
of the act, as stated in 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1987), are to "maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." Another
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designed with a primary objective that is noncriminal, here the
collection of revenue. 414 Criminal sanctions are available for tax
evaders, 415 largely on utilitarian deterrence grounds. No doubt,
like the schemes discussed in Morissette, crimes under the Internal
Revenue Code would be mala prohibitum.
Congress has never attempted to define crimes under the code
as strict liability offenses. In fact, the Supreme Court has
consistently over a sixty year period read the willful element found
in Title 26 offenses as to require not only knowledge of fact, but
also knowledge of the law.416 Most recently , for example, the
Court reversed a decision by the Seventh Circuit that held that the
tax payer could raise a good faith misunderstanding of the law
only if the defendant's beliefs were reasonable.417 Instead, the
Court held that the appropriate standard was whether the defendant
made a good faith mistake. That was so even though the mistake
involved a question of law. 418
Cheek419 and other cases interpreting criminal
provisions420 under the tax laws are interesting for a number of
reasons. Even if the crime is a misdemeanor, Congress has
included a mens rea term. 421 Further, the Court has interpreted
that term to allow a good faith claim of ignorance of the law.422
Apart from the interpretative problems, the regulatory goals of the
congressional scheme are not impaired by imposing a fault
requirement even where, as it is in Cheek, a very strict fault

example would be the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Act of 1988, 15
U.S.C. § 78ff, which provides civil and criminal penalties for violations of the
Securities and Exchange Act.
414.
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-5801 (1992).
415.
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1992).
416.
United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 395-98 (1933).
417.
Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604, 610-11 (1991).
418.
!d. at 611.
419.
!d.
420.
See, e.g., United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976); United
States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973) (interpreting I.R.C. § 7206-7207); United
States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933) (interpreting the Revenue Act of 1926,
§ 1114(a) and the Revenue Act of 1928, § 146).
421.
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1992).
422.
Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604, 610-11 (1991).

1993]

DOES CULPABILITY MATTER?

255

requirement. 423
Much the same can be said about federal environmental laws.
Contrary to the presumption of Morissette, whereby the Court
found less need for a mens rea requirement in mala prohibitum
offenses because of the need for efficient enforcement, the reality
of regulatory schemes today demonstrates that the enforcement
goals and traditional notions of fault are not incompatible. Hence,
what appeared to be the foundation of the distinction in Morissette,
that abandoning mens rea was the only way in which to enforce
regulatory goals, is largely contradicted by the facts. Important
public policy concerns need not be impaired even if a court or a
legislature imposes a fault requirement. 424

VII.

CONCLUSION

The confusion created by 42 U.S.C. § 6928 requires
Supreme Court resolution of this question. Currently, litigants in
different circuits receive unequal treatment under the law.
The split among the circuits certainly invites the Supreme

423.
!d. at 610 (requiring the government in criminal tax cases to prove
that "the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this
duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty").
424.
See United States v. Int 'I Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558
(1971); see also United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664-65
(3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208
(1985). The Court held that "knew or should have known" is the standard.
It may be that the problem is setting the appropriate fault standard, although
these cases suggest one standard, this is most appropriately the work of the
legislature. Legislators, however, do not address this problem often enough.
Some commentators have argued that civil enforcement provisions do not
provide adequate protection for the enviroment. See, e.g., Robert A. Milne,
Comment, The Mens Rea Requirements Of 17te Federal Environmental Statutes:
Stn'ct Criminal Liability in Substance But Not Fomt, 37 B UFF. L. REV., 307,
318-20 (1988-89). That position ignores other enforcement devices such as
injunctive relief and passing on clean up costs. In addition, consistent with
Congress's intention, see, e.g. H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 30,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 6238, 6268, I have argued that criminal
sanctions should be reserved for truly blameworthy offenders, and that
criminalizing only truly blameworthy people will not impair the legitimate
goals of protecting the environment.
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Court to grant review. 425 This article has argued that the
approach taken by the Third Circuit is the correct interpretation of
42 U.S.C. § 6928 and, therefore, should be adopted by the
Supreme Court. 426 Given the ambiguous language of the Ac~27
and the uncertain legislative history,428 the Court should analyze
42 U.S.C. § 6928 consistent with Liparota and Model Penal Code
provisions governing statutory construction. 429 The argument to
the contrary ,430 that to attach knowledge to the permit
requirement would create an ignorance of the law defense, misses
the mark. The maxim that ignorance of the law is no defense has
no application in cases involving statutes where the mens rea term
attaches to a material element that itself may involve a question of
law.43t
The courts that have given narrow construction to 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928 have been influenced by the need to protect the
environment. 432 That goal is obviously critically important. But
the Ninth Circuit, for example, assumes acritically that allowing
a defendant to demonstrate a lack of knowledge of the permit
requirement would impair environmental protection goals. 433

425.
Sup. Ct. R. 10.1(a) (1990) ("a petition for writ will be granted
"[w]hen a United States court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same
matter . . ..").
426.
See discussion supra notes 386-93 and accompanying text.
427.
See 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1992).
428.
See H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1976
U .S.C.CA.N. 6238; H.R. REP. No., 1444 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 5028; H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 5576.
429.
See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); see also,
MODEL PENAL CODE§§ 2.02, 2.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
See, e.g., Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425; see also United States v.
430.
Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
See discussion supra notes 386-93 and accompanying text.
431.
432.
See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990) (stating that the Court • s conclusion is
consistent with the purpose ofRCRA where "the overriding concern ofRCRA
is the grave danger to people and the environment from hazardous wastes").
433.
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F. 2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
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Given the wide array of enforcement mechanisms in the regulatory
scheme,434 the environment can be protected without risking the
incarceration of an offender whose conduct was not blameworthy.
Review by the Supreme Court of the intercircuit conflict
would give it another opportunity to clarify the rules governing
statutory construction. As discussed above, the Court's approach
is hardly consistent. 435 But Liparota demonstrated the strong
influence of the Model Penal Code's general culpability
provisions. 436 Justice Brennan's opinion did not adopt those
provisions. For example, the Court did not overrule cases like
International Minerals, cases that would have come out differently
under the Code. 437 But the actual holding in Liparota was
consistent with those provisions. In light of Congress's inability
to enact coherent criminal law reform, 438 engrafting the Code's
provisions may be the best way to bring coherence to statutory
construction cases involving federal criminal laws.

434.
See 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (d)(g)(h) (1992) (prescribing vanous
enforcement provisions).
435.
See discussion supra notes 209-29 and accompanying text.
See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425-28 (1985)
436.
(Brennan, J ., choosing to have the term "knowingly" apply as a material
element of statute where Congress was silent as to what mens rea term should
apply).
437.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (Proposed Official Draft
1962). Under this approach, "knowingly" would have attached to the term
"regulation." See discussion supra notes X-Y and accompanying text.
438.
S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1979) (never enacted).

